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Jack and Jill Go to C-o urt:
Litigating a Peer Sexual arassment
Case Under Title
Susan P. Stuartt
Abstract
Title IX peer sexual harassment cases present challenges to litigators
because of the unique educational environment in which these cases
arise. This Article attempts to educate litigators on the prima facie case,
evidentiary issues, and the overall presentation ofpeer sexual harass~
ment cases.

Introduction
Trying any case involving public schools can be difficult in the best
of times. Courts are often loathe to interfere in the educational process
because ofschools' greater and somewhat specialized expertise in matters
1
of legitimate pedagogi.cal concem and because of the long-held notions
2
that the running of the schools is best left to local and state contro1.
There is some merit to that aloofness: In matters of education policy and
the like, challenges to curriculum, teaching methods, and other assorted
B.A. ( 1973), DePauw University; M.Ed. (1976), Valparaiso University; J.D. ( 1982),
Indiana University-Indianapolis School of Law. The author is an Associate Professor
of Law at Valparaiso University School ofLaw. Professor Stuart would like to thank
Chuck Waller, whose work as her research assistant was timely and invaluable; Ivan
Bodensteiner for graciously agreeing to read and coJmlent on the Article; Melody
Richardson Daily at University ofMissouri-Columbia Law School for her wonderfully
constructed Title IX legal writing problem that sparked the idea for this Article; and the
members of her 2004-05 legal writing class for their inspiration.
1
E.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988) (school
district may control student speech so long as such control is "reasonably related to
legitimate-pedagogical concerns"); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 3384.0 (1985)
(schools are special environments in which the health and safety of children are high
t

priorities).

·

2

E.g., Bd. ofEduc., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 863-64 ( 1982) (recognizing that "local school boards have broad discretion in the-

management of school affairs"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 ( 1923) (noting
that "(t]he power of the state to compel school attendance[,] ... to make reasonable
regulations for all schools," and "to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it
supports" is not questioned).
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educational functions are better left to the professional judgment and
discretion of school districts and their employees. Thus, so long as the
school districts are not violating their students' constitutional or civil
rights during the course of exercising that professional judgment and
3
discretion, courts will more than likely leave them alone. Even in those
instances, schools are considered a special environment wherein the law
will allow a little more leeway for the control ofconstitutional rights than
4
in other venues.
Where courts seem to have more expertise-or at least are more likely
to interfere-are matters in which a student has been injured, be it through
traditional tort liability, special tort liability for schools, student discipline,
5
or criminal activity. Courts somehow feel more comfortable taking on
a legal role in areas of expertise that have more lawyer-ese and less
education-ese. These easy legal questions are torts committed against
students and similar duty issues, such as schools' negligent or reckless
supervision of students resulting in injury. True, special considerations
may apply in these cases because of the type of victims and th'e special
environment, that is, public school students and the environment neces6
sary to care for, protect, and teach them.
However, such special educational circumstances do not seem to
translate well into all civil rights violations. One such circumstance is
suspicionless drug testing, when a school district determines that its own,
3

Public school students do not shed their constitutional rights "at the schoolhouse
gate., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty~ Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
4

See, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. oflndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 ofPottawatomie Countyv. Earls,

536 U.S. 822,838 (2002) (school policy allowing drug testing ofstudents participating
in extracurricular activities); Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 271-73 (control of
student speech); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001)
(school uniforrn policy).

s See, e.g., Borne ex rei. Borne v. Northwest Allen County Sch. Corp., 532 N.E.2d
1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (special schoolC:{istrictliability); Chrysingerv. Decatur, 445
N.E.2d260 (Ohio Ct.App. 1982) (student discipline); Maxwell ex rei. Maxwell v. Sch.
Dist. ofPbila., 53 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (traditional tort liability); Johnson
ex rei. Johnson v. Sch. Dist. ofMillard, 573 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 1998) (special school
district liability).
6

Indeed, the notion of in loco parentis may be making a comeback. Compare New
Jersey, 469 U.S. at 336 (student searches are not conducted.as a function of in loco
parentis) with Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-31 (student searches are conducted because schools
are guardians).
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personal "War on Drugs" necessitates that students be treated with no
7
more respect for their privacy than cattle to the slaughter. Such programs
8
are "capricious, even perverse." Nevertheless, school districts have been
given a great deal of discretion and local control in such cases.
Into this mix of easy personal injury cases and difficult civil rights
cases are thrown Title IX sexual harassment claims. For courts, a teacheron-student sexual harassment claim appears to be easy on its face. Courts
have had increasingly comprehensive experience under comparable Title
Vll sexual harassment claims by employees against supervisors in the past
few years. Hence, courts can act lawyerly when it comes to students
being harassed by teachers: They know it when they see it. Indeed, the
act of sexual h·arassment was not even at issue in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District, when a teacher had sexual intercourse with
9
an under-agedstudent. So given their parallels to Title Vllcases, studenton-student (or peer) sexual harassment cases should be among those
lawyerly cases with which courts would not have any problems. Not so.
The difficulty in trying student-on-student, or peer, sexual harassment
cases is two-fold: First, courts are loathe to hold schools liable for sexual
harassment under Title IX under any circumstances. The proof of the
teacher's harassment in Gebserwas indisputable, but the school district's
10
accountability was not. To insulate a school district from being liable
11
for acts ofdiscrimination ofwhich it was not "aware" -the secret sexual
relationship ofone ofits teachers with a student-the Supreme Court aban12
doned employer-employee vicarious liability under respondeat superior.
Instead, a wronged student must prove that "an official who at a minimum
has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute
corrective measures on the [school district's] behalfha[d] actual knowl13
edge of discrimination" and responded with deliberate indifference.
7

See Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v . Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
8
Earls, 536 U.S. at 843 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
9

524

u.s. 274, 292 (1998).

10

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292.
11
Also integral to the Court's restrictive analysis of school district liability was
Congress' failure to create an express right of action for Title IX sexual harassment
claims. Gebser, 524 U . S. at 285.
12/d.
13

/d. at 290 (emphasis added).
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Adding to the difficulty is that Title IX is funding legislation without an
express private right of action. As a consequence, the obligation of a
school district to its students to comply with Title IX is more an arm'slength contractual relationship as a condition of funding rather than a
14
more personal obligation as directly imposed by Title Vll.
Second, the rules ofengagement in peer sexual harassment cases seem
to require paying more attention to this special pedagogical environment
and its special considerations. The playing field is different from Title
VII sexual harassment causes of action for no other discernible reason
than that the players-victims and harassers-are all public school students.
Courts become confused in this environment and outside their lawyerly
function, not because the cause of action is too educational or pedagogical, but because the environment is in a foreign landscape: a school. To_
better litigate these cases, counsel must lea1n to navigate the topography
of that environment and persuade a court that the environment is not all
that special in these tort-like cases, a distinction that does not seem to
matter in teacher-on-student sexual harassment cases and clearly does not
matter in other personal injury cases that occur on school grounds.
Under such constrictions, there should be little wonder at the difficulty
15
in trying a Title IX peer sexual harassment case. However, with a better
handle on that educational environment and on courts' concerns about
their own expertise, a litigator has effective ways to try these cases. In
particular, a litigator might better educate courts to the supervisory
liability of school districts and their deliberate indifference to that liability
in matters of harassment just as they are in tort cases. With a litigator's
perspective in mind, Part I analyzes the prima facie case for Title IX peer
sexual harassment in the K-12 public schools. Part II addresses evidentiary issues to confront the inevitable motion for sununaryjudgment filed
by the school district that successfully tertninates most of these cases.
Part ill then discusses ways to incorporate greater knowledge ofthe educational environment to improve the presentation of the case. Winning
these cases will never be easy-indeed other, more winnable causes of
14

/d. at 286-87.
15
See also Meghan E. Chemer-Ranft, The Empty Promise of Title IX· Why Girls
Need Courts to Reconsider Liability Standards and Preemption in School Sexual
Harassment Cases, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1891 (2003).
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16

action may better ameliorate the underlying problems -but ways exist
to confront the courts' concerns about these special envirorunents that
tend to favor school districts rather than students.

I. Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County
Board o · Education and the Prima Facie Case
Title IX prohibits discrimination in public schools on the basis of sex:
~'No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
17
financial assistance .... " On the shoulders of Cannon v. University of
19
18
Chicago and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme
Court set out the contours of a school district's liability for sexual
harassment ofa student by a teacher in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
20
School District.
In Gebser') there was no question that sexual harassment occtJrred when
a male high school teacher had sexual intercourse on numerous occasions
21
with a freshman female student. While the school district claimed it
was unaware ofthis sexual relationship, the student-plaintiffinsisted that
the school district was liable for the teacher's misconduct and that such
liability should be based on the same standard used for Title Vll
supervisor~on-employee sexual harassment, simple agency principles that
16

Title IX is not a very effective way to remedy the assaults, batteries, and .other
injuries suffered by children, which are litigated as acts of sexual harassment. See Ivan
E. Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment-Interference with an Equal Educational Opportunity
in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79 NEB. L. REv. 1, 43-47 (2000)~ However, to
the extent that Title IX does indeed try to rectify the ''discriminatory impact" of sexual
misconduct in schools, a few nice-sized judgments and loss of federal funding might
just tum a few bea.ds. Change necessarily starts small.
17
20 U.S.C. § 168l{a) (1994).
18
441 U.S. 677 ( 1979). Title IX provides for an implied private right of action. /d.
at 703.
19
503 U.S. 60 (1992). A victim can recover monetary damages for a violation of
Title IX when a teacher sexually harasses a student. /d. at 76.
20

21

524 u.s. 274 (1998).
/d. at 278.
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would have imputed liability to the school district. However, the
Supreme Court meandered tlrrough a convoluted statutory interpretation
and analysis of liability under Title IX to conclude that the Title VII
23
statutory analysis cannot apply. In addition, the Court was uncomfortable with jerry-rigging liability on schools without Congress' express
pennission, so Justice O'Connor instead relied on intuition and baling
wire to construct a contract theory to establish a school district's liability
for proven sexual harassment by a teacher. This contractual construct for
scaling back liability for student sexual harassment is premised on Title
IX' s fundin_g "agreement" between the govennnent and the school district.
The public school districts will countenance no gender discrimination in
24
exchange for the distribution of federal funds to help run their schools.
22

/d. at 283; see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) {Title
VII supervisor-on-employee sexual harassment). 'fhat agency liability arises when the
employer knew or should have known of the harassing behavior and failed to stop it;
see for example, Burlington Industries Incorporated v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758-59
(1998).
23

Justice O'Connor reached this result because Title VII's statutory defmition of
"employer"-whicb includes an "agent" of the employer-has no comparable parallel
definition in Title IX's fimding entity, an "educational institution." Gebser, 524 U.S.
at 283. However, this statutory interpretation makes no sense because "educational
institution" does not show up in the prohibitory language ofTitle IX as "employer'' does
in Title VII. Title VII prohibits unlawful employment practices by an employer. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). On the other hand, Title IX prohibits the discrimination
''under any education program or activity receiving Federal fmancial assistance." 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, the meaning of"educational institution" does not even enter into who can or cannot be held liable for the.discrimination
under Title IX. Instead, the prohibition applies to "program or activity," which includes
''all ofthe operations of ... a local educational agency." 20 U .S.C. -§ l687(2)(B) (1988).
A ulocal educational agency" means
a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within
a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perforrn a service
fimction for, public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county,
township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or of or for
a combination of school districts or counties that is recognized in a State as an
administrative agency for its public elementary schools or secondary schools.
20 U.S.C. § 7801(26)(A) (2003). That is not the same thing as Justice O'Connor's
concern for an "educational institution." Nor does the "agency" of an employee of an
educational institution or local educational agency seem to have anything to do with
liability under Title IX.
24
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286.
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This promise by a school district is to "'protect[]' individuals from dis25
criminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal funds. " By this
logic, according to Justice O'Connor, a school district cannot protect a
26
student from a discriminatory practice of which it is unaware.
Justice 0' Connor's conclusion also relied on the statutory enforcement
scheme under Title IX whereby a funding recipient is entitled an opportunity to get into compliance by correcting the discrimination before its
27
funding is withdrawn. Thus, a person capable of taking corrective
measures for the school district must be aware of the problem but fail to
28
respond to the problem, in other words, be deliberately indifferent. In
Gebser, the school district was not aware of the sexual congress of its
teacher with a fourteen-year-old student, so no liability could attach under
29
the contract, and the school district was not liable. Once the school
district knew ofthe problem-the couple was caught in the act-it fired the
teacher, and the school district instituted corrective action. Too late for
the plaintiffs injury, however. The school district was not liable for past
acts of which it was unaware and for which it could not have enacted
30
corrective measures, so there was no deliberate indifference.
Thus, the basic proof of teacher-on-student sexual harassment is (1)
an act of sexual harassment by a teacher, of which (2) a school official
31
who has the authority to take corrective action (3) has actual knowledge,
(4) but that official acts with deliberate indifference in failing to take such
action. The contractual duty to protect students from discrimination only
2

s /d. at 287.

26/d.
27

/d. at 288-89.

28

/d. at 290.

29

/d. at 291.

30

What "corrective measures" could any school institute under such circumstances?
Give the student back her virginity?
31
It is ironic a school district will not be held liable under agency principles for
actually having engaged in sexual harassment, but it will be held liable for sexual
harassment if one of its agents acts incorrectly. As a consequence of the Davis reasoning, one sees a result exemplified by Rasnick v. Dickenson County School Board, 333
F. Supp. 2d 560 (W.D. Va. 2004). In Rasnick, the school district avoided all liability
for teacher-on-student sexual harassment by proving that none of its board members
knew of the harassing teacher's activity. Because only the board could take the appropriate corrective measures, the district was not liable regardless of its school
administrators' knowledge and failure to act. /d. at 565-67.
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•

kicks in when the school is actually aware that such activity is occurring.
The Title IX standard for civil liability is thus more protective of the
32
institution and less protective of the victim; it is no longer a duty to
protect, but a duty to stop. Gebser and its reasoning eventually fortned
the foundation for student-on-student, or peer, sexual harassment under
Title IX.
This foundation for determining school district liability under Title
IX has a serious ramification in its contractual analysis that carries over
into any analysis ofliability for peer sexual harassment. The Court turned
a school district's contractual obligation into a "one-bite" rule. Under
the Gebser analysis, a predatory teacher gets one bite at a student; past
acts of discrimination are not remediable, only future ones are, despite
the school district's contractual promise to protect students from sexual
harassment under Title IX. Thus, Gebser set the stage for a loose web
ofsupervisory liability through which numerous student injuries may flow
33
without recourse. As it turns out, the web of supervisory liability for
peer sexual harassment has even larger holes, so large as to make the web
almost nonexistent.
In Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board ofEducation,
the Supreme Court put its imprimatur on student-on-student sexual
34
harassment as a private cause of action under Title IX. In deriving a
prima facie case, Justice O'Connor adopted a rule in Davis for later
application that is unavoidably linked to the sheer amount of evidence
ofovetwhelmingly bad harassment that this plaintiffendured before filing
suit. The case involved allegations brought by a fifth-grade female
student, LaShonda, against G.F., one of her male classmates. Fifthgraders are usually ten or eleven years old, but G.F. was a bad actor in
many adult senses of the word. According to the complaint, he tried to
touch LaShonda's breasts and genital area while telling her he wanted
32

See Julie Davies, Assessing Institutional Responsibility for Sexual Harassment
in Education, 77 TuL. L. REv. 387,401-408 (2002) (examining the viability of private
enforcement of Title IX).
33

Compare this attitude with the Court's tighter net in the "War on Drugs" lest any
drug-using students get away. See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 822-24 (holding that a
school's policy ofdrug testing students who participated in extracurricular activities did
not violate the Fourth Amendment).
34
526
629, 629-30 (1999).

u.s.
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to "get in bed" with her and wanted to feel her breasts. He also rubbed
up against her in a sexual manner. On one occasion, G.F. put a door stop
in his pants during physical educ-ation class and acted in a sexually suggestive manner to LaShonda. This conduct occurred during the course
of several months and not just to LaS honda but to other girls in the class
as well. These acts eventually led to G.F.'s being charged with and
35
pleading guilty to sexual battery.
LaShonda further alleged that she and her mother complained repeatedly to her classroom teacher and her physical education teacher, but her

complaints went unanswered. Indeed, it took three months ofcomplaints
before LaShonda's classroom seating was switched so she would not have
to sit next to G.F. Even her female classmates were unable to get an
audience with the principal; a teacher told them, "'If[the principal] wants
36
you, he'll call you. '" G.F. was never disciplined, and the principal asked
37
LaShonda' smother why she was the only one complaining. LaShonda's
complaint set out her sufferings at the hands ofG.F.: She could not concentrate in school and experienced a drop in her previously high grades.
She also wrote a suicide note, which her father discovered. She filed suit
38
under Title IX and was instantly challenged by the school district.
The Supreme Court determined that LaShonda's complaint should
survive the school district's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule ofCivil
Procedure 12(b)(6). In so doing, the Court formulated the following
elements that a plaintiffmust prove in order to hold a school district liable
for peer sexual harassment under Title IX: (1) the sexually harassing
student engages in conduct that is "so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive" that (2) it "can be said to deprive the victim[] of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school,'' and (3) the
educational institution has actual knowledge of such harassment (4) but
39
is deliberately indifferent to it.
35
36

!d. at 633-35.

/d. at 635.
37
Also according to the allegations, the school district had instituted no training for
its personnel to deal with peer sexual harassment and had no official policy governing
its reporting and discipline. /d.
38
/d. at 634.
39
/d. at 650; Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (lOth
Cir. 1999). This rule is closely akin to the hostile work environment rule under Title

252
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In Davis as it did in Gebser, the Court concentrated on the school
district's own misconduct in detetmining that it could be held responsible

for peer sexual harassment and focused on intentional conduct that would
40
violate the clear terms of Title IX. Shaded somewhat by her pursuit of
a Title IX contractual duty in Gebser, Justice O'Connor's analysis
examined school districts' conunon law duties to protect students from
41
third-party tortious behavior ofother students. She especially noted that
schools have a "custodial and tutelary'' responsibility over students that
gives them a higher supervisory responsibility and control not ex_ercised
42
in other circumstances by the state over adults. In this respect, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged the special educational environment in which
peer sexual harassment can occur and concluded that a school district can
be held liable for a student's actions because it has substantial control
over that student, over the harassing environment, and, under certain con43
ditions, over the harassment itself~ But then she injected the businesslike, contractual responsibility ofTitle IX by asserting that school district
liability arises when it "subjects'' students to discrimination under an
44
"operation" of the educational institution. Swerving from the typical
supervisory liability ofschools, the lawyerly, business-like cause ofaction
VII, except that it requires an adverse educational consequence that the hostile work
environment claim no longer requires. See, e.g., Burlington, 524 U.S. at 758-59 (holding
that an employer must show it exercised reasonable care in preventing harassment and
that employee did not take advantage of preventive or corrective measures); Meritor
Sav. Bank, FSB, 4 77 U.S. at 68, 72 (holding that economic hattn is not necessary to bring
a sexual harassment case and that the existence of an employer's policy against
discrimination will not insulate it from liability); see generally VernaL. Williams &
Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Jsn ,t Just a Kiss: Title IX and Student-to-Student
Harassment, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 427~29; 442-456 (1997). But see Frazier v.
Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F .3d 52 (1st Cir. 2002). According to Frazier v. Fairhaven
School Committee, a plaintiff must prove "(1) that [she] was a student, who was (2)
subjected to harassment (3) based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently
severe and pervasive to create an abusive educational environment; and ( 5) that a
cognizable basis for institutional liability exists." /d. at 66. There is no formal requirement of an adverse educational consequence.
40 . .
.
· Dav1s, 526 U.S. at 641-42.
41
/d. at 644.
42
.
.
/d. at 646.
43
/d. at 644.
44
/d. at 64445.
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from Gebser is infected with the messier, educational role ofthe school's
special circ\Jmstances over its charges. That new spin on proving Title
IX violations for peer sexual harassment equally infects the manner of
proving a prima facie case.
First, theplaintiffmust prove that the harasser engaged in actionable
sexual harassment, conduct that is severe, pervasive, and objectively
45
offensive. Moving from the educational special environment to the
lawyerly, business-like analysis, Justice O'Connor relied on a test from
46
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., a Title Vll same-sex
harassment case, that proof of a hostile working environment ''depends
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation ofthe words
47
used or the physical acts performed." Continuing to follow Oncale, the
Court detennined that actionable conduct could cover circumstances when
the school "is pertneated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions ofthe
victim's [educational opportunity] and create an abusive [school] environ48
ment. " That constellation of circumstances includes such things as the
ages ofthe harasser and victim and the number of stud.ents involved, but
the Court was not too keen on getting into any other specifics except to
say what such conduct is not: peer sexual harassment is not mere teasing
and name-calling. Apparentlypersuad~d by the National School Boards
Association brief, Justice O'Connor was reluctant to punish all genderrelated behavior in which children are commonly wont to engage that
might otherwise be unacceptable to adults. Thus, "insults, banter, teasing,
45

Proof of peer sexual harassment does not .have the extra "hoop" required ofTitle
VII sexual harassment cases that the victim-also fmd the conductsubjectively offensive.
See, e.g., Far3gherv. CityofBoca Raton,.524 U.S. 775,787 (1998). Justice O'Connor
does not suggest why the victim's subjective view is not important in peer sexual
harassment in Davis. However, perhaps this lack of emphasis on subjectivity is a
function of the probable victim's age: the younger the child, the less likelythe child will
actually understand the sexual nature of the harassment. On the other hand, ·it is just
as likely that the subjectivity has in reality been replaced by another element of
O'Connor's rule, the adverse consequence. See infra text accompanying notes 126-48.
46
523 u.s. 75 (1998).
47
/d. at 82; Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
48
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993)).
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shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the
students subjected to it" are not enough to constitute actionable peer
49
sexual harassment. Instead, the Court decried a vague notion of some
other type of behavior that might constitute severe, pervasive, and

objectively offensive sexual harassment.
Whatever the conduct, it must cause the second element of the prima
facie case, that it is so severe and pervasive that it denies to the victim
equal access to the educational function ofthe institution funded by Title
50
IX. This somewhat recursive element does not require proof of a
physical denial of access to the school and its resources. Instead, the
pervasive nature of the harasser's conduct must be systemic and "so
unden11ine[] and detract[] from the victims' educational experience, that
the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's
51
resources and opportunities." In so concludjng, Justice O'Connor
obliquely referred to Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, which
established that, under Title VII, a plaintiffneed only prove that the sexual
harassment "alter[ed] the conditions of[the victim's] employment and
52
create[d] an abusive working environment." Clearly, Justice O'Connor
relied on Title VII's hostile work environment test in establishing whether

a student has been discriminated against in her access to the educational
program. However, a mere decline in grades is not enough. Again, what
is enough is not clear, but there must be a '-'systemic effect" of denying
"equal access to an educational program or activity." Thus, one incident
likely will not suffice; what will suffice are incidents on the other end of
the spectrum, "severe, gender-based mistreatment played out on a 'wide53
spread level' among students. " In any event, the evidenc-e ofa systemic
effect is tempered by the special educational envirorunent and the
tolerable conduct of kids being kids.
Third in a prima facie case is the trigger for school district liability,
its actual knowledge of the peer sexual harassment in an educational
49

Davis, 526 U.S. at 651-52 (emphasis added) .
.so /d. at 652-53.
51

/d. at 651.
52
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 4 77 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
3
~ Davis, 526 U.S. at 653.
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activity. The Court does not elucidate what facts would constitute actual
knowledge in a hypothetical instance. However, the Davis evidence
implied and Justice O'Connor so suggested that LaShonda's and her
mother's reports to her teachers and her principal would be sufficient
actual knowledge by individuals who should have controlled the situation
4
and therefore imputed knowledge to the school district itself. 5 Direct
5
evidence of sexual harassment is sufficient proof: 5 "recipients may be
liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual
56
harassment. " As a consequence, if the harassing conduct is reported
57
to a teacher or school administrator, it is a "known act."
Fourth and last, the school district's deliberate indifference must
subject students to harassment by causing them to undergo or "make them
58
liable or vulnerable" to sexual harassment.
The school district's
behavior must be "clearly unreasonable in light of the known circum59
stances." Courts will not necessarily second-guess the remedial efforts
"[P]etitioner may be able to show that the Board 'subject[ed]' LaShonda to discrimination by failing to respond in any way over a period of five months to complaints
ofG .F.'s in-school misconduct from LaShonda and other female students." Davis, 52 6
U.S. at 649. This proof is, of course, an agency itnputation of liability to the school
district for the bad acts of its teachers, which seems to somewhat undercut the liability
analysis of Gebser and Davis itself. "[We] reject[] the use ofagency principles to itnpute
liability to the district for the misconduct of its teachers." /d. at 642.
55
!d. at 643, 644.
S6 !d. at 648 (emphasis added).
57
As a consequence of the clarity with which Justice O'Connor made her point, a
school district cannot defend itself by claiming it was not on notice that such conduct
would trigger its liability. Justice O'Connor noted that, in March 1993, the National
School Boards Association issued a publication advising school boards how to prevent
sexual harassment in the schools. And by the time Davis was handed down, the United
States Department of Education issued a Guidance through its Office for Civil Rights
that advised that student-on-student sexual harassment was proscnbed by Title IX' s antidiscrimination provisions. Davis, 526 U.S. at 647-48. As a consequence, a school district's actual knowledge is contextualized by contemporary policies and concerns. In
other words, actual knowledge is now more easily imputed to school districts because
peer sexual harassment is a cutting-edge issue that has captured the interest of those
groups that defme school district policies, thereby putting school districts on notice of
"proscribed misconduct" for which they will be held accountable. /d. at 648; see infra
S4

text accompanying notes 200-15.
ss Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45 (quotingRANDOMHOUSEDicriONARYOFTHEENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1415 (1966) (defining "subject'')).
59
/d. at 649.
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of school officials in trying to control the situation, but they should
respond in a manner that is ''not clearly unreasonable.'~ In LaShonda's
case, the school district did not respond at all for five months.
Applying this four-part principle to LaS honda's allegations, the Court
detertnined that the case should proceed, reversing the trial court's
granting the school district's motion to dismiss. She made a prima facie
case of peer sexual harassment; from LaShonda's case, subsequent
plaintiffs can make their cases.
Obviously, any complaint brought under Title IX for peer sexual
harassment will have to establish these four elements. Since the Davis
decision, a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss such cases on the basis that no such
61
cause of action exists is no longer an option for school districts. That,
ofcourse, still leaves those cases challenged by a 12(b)(6) motion because
the pleadings themselves allegedly lack proof of the elements. For
instance, in Carroll K. v. Fayette County Board ofEducation, the school
district asserted that the plaintiff's pleadings failed to allege that genderrelated harassment occutred, that the school district knew, that the school
district acted with deliberate indifference, and that the school district had
62
the discriminatory intent to violate Title IX. The court ruled, to the
contrary, that the victim pleaded adequately when she alleged that, when

she was a sixth-grader, she was the victim of several crimes of violence
(including physical assaults) on school grounds because of her gender.
The incident that finally prompted the victim's parents to remove her
from school occ•Jrred during lunch hour when a male student approached
the victim in a bullying fashion. When the victim was unable to escape,
the male student threw her over his shoulder, swung her around, and flung
her into a steel pole. The teacher on duty failed to intervene, saying only,
"Here we go again." The victim suffered spinal injuries and loss ofvision
in her left eye. The court indicated that these well-pleaded facts overcame
/d.
61
See also Rowinskyv. Bryanlndep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5thCir. 1996)
(peer sexual harassment complaints must allege that female students' complaints are
treated differently than male students') (pre-Davis); see generally Emmalena K.
Quesada, Note, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Harassment
and the Standardfor School Liability under .Title IX, 83 CORNELLL. REv. 1014, 103 9-47
60

(1998).
62

19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (S.D. W.Va. 1998).

'
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63

the school district's 12(b)(6) motion. Similar results were reached in
64
Haines v. Metropolitan Government ofDavidson County, Tennessee
65
and Ray v. Antioch Unified School District, wherein the trial courts
determined that well-pleaded complaints setting forth factual allegations
of each of the elements would survive a motion to dismiss. Less certain,
however, is the fate of peer sexual harassment cases on motions for sutnmary judgment.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment:
Testing the Quality of the Evidence
A motion for summary judgment is the ultimate test for the quality of
evidence compiled by the plaintiff before trial. It is an oft-used-and
successfully so-tool filed by school districts to rid themselves of Title
66
IX peer sexual harassment suits. Governed by Federal Rules of Civil
63

Carroll K., 19 F. Supp. at 620-22. The author makes no comment on the efficacy
of the court's using Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6) as the appropriate vehicle

for attacking proof issues when all that is required is notice pleading.
64
32 F. Supp. 2d 991 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). A Tennessee federal district court denied
the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss filed by the school district in Haines. In that case, two
male fifth-grade students allegedly tried to rape a classmate. Similar to the victim in
Davis, Haines alleged multiple instances of assault, fondling, and physical and verbal
abuse. The victim and her parents lodged repeated complaints to the victim's teacher,
the school principal, and the school board itself. What little discipline was administered
was totally ineffective. The victim claimed that, as a result, she missed numerous days
ofschool and was unable to satisfactorily complete her classes. The court held that these
allegations sufficiently constituted a prima facie Title IX peer sexual harassment case.
Haines, 32 F. Supp. at 999·1000.
65
107 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2000). In Ray, the school district filed a Federal
Rules ofCivil Procedure 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state
a cause of action in a case filed for peer sexual harassment for sexual orientation. The
victim was a middle-school student whose mother was a transgendered female going
through gender transformation. In his complaint, the victim alleged that he was the
subject of repeated taunts, insults, and abuse based on the perception that he was
homosexual. Despite his repeated reports of the harassment, the school district failed
to take any action to stop the conduct. The ultimate attack occurred when another
student with a reputatiQn for violence battered the victim, causing a concussion, hearing
in1pairment in one ear, and chronic headaches. The district court determined that, by
these allegations, the victim had met his pleading burden sufficient to overcome the
s.chool district's motion. Ray, 107 F. Supp. at 1167-71.
66

A cursory examination ofthe post-Davis reported cases reveal an abysmal success

rate for plaintiffs. Of the couple dozen cases reported to date in which school districts
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Pro~edure 56, sununary judgment is granted if"there is no genuine issue

of material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." A method for adjudicating cases short of trial, summary
judgment invokes a review of factual presentations-pleadings, depositions, the fruits of discovery, and affidavits-when the facts are disputed
67
and is the ultimate test ofthe quality of evidence. A party is not entitled
to sununary judgment if a reasonable jury could decide the case for either
68
party. Because schoo1districts are the movants in these cases, the burden
is on the victim to come up with something more than vague, conclusory
69
allegations in order to create a genuine issue of material fact.
70
This burden requires presentation ofspecific probative facts showing
71
that there is a need to go to trial. Even construing the evidence most
72
favorably to the nonmovap.t, a court must have before it something

filed motions for s
judgment on the Title IX student-on-student sexual
harassment issue, very few victims made it past the motion. Ironically, more mal~
victims were successful at this stage than female victims: Vance v. Spencer County Pub.
Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000) (female); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952 (D. Kan. 2005) (male); Schroeder ex rei. Schroeder
v. Maumee Bd. ofEduc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (male); Montgomery
v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2000) (male); see
generally ROBERT SHOOP & DEBRA L. EDWARDS) How TO STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK AND CURRICULUM GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS AND
TEACHERS 99-104 ( 1994) (addressing sexual harassment of male students and gay,
lesbian, and bisexual students). Furthennore, peer sexual harassment cases seem to have

a lower success rate than teacher-on-student sexual harassment cases. See Davies, supra
note 32, at 431~33.
67
"When a motion for s
. judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party .... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights,
Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003).
68
The test is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law.'' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
69
FED. R. CIV. P . 56(e); Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 822.
7
°FED. R. CIV. P. .56(e).
71
E.g., Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004);
Winn v. United Press Int'l, 938 F. Supp. 39, 46(D.D.C. 1996), ajf'd, 1997 WL404959
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
.
12
See, e.g., CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 152730 (1st Cir. 1996); Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 536 (lOth Cir.
1995).

\
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besides conjecture, speculation, and fantasy. Resting on the pleadings
is also not sufficient. The victim must bring to the gunfight something
mo.r e than "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsup74
ported speculation. " These material facts must be developed as soon
as it is feasible, if not before the complaint is filed, then immediately
thereafter. However, one should never rely on the fruits of discovery to
make one's prima facie case. Rather, plaintiffs counsel needs to build
the case from the outset with information from which to develop affidavits and with any other evidence or official docutnents to which a witness
will attest. When a school district's typical opening gambit is to suggest
that there are no genuine issues of material fact to show it is not liable,
the immediate response must be to show there is such a dispute su-fficient
to go to trial. And that means the litigator has to have facts for each of
the elements.
In addition, counsel must account for and tinge those facts within the
specialized educational environment. Preparing a case for peer sexual
harassment will require conscious preparation for entering what is the
undisputed bailiwick of the school district's counsel. Consequently,
victims' lawyers must be prepared contextually for these motions, to the
point of gathering information from expert witnesses familiar with the
area. Even at the summary judgment stage, plaintiff must outmaneuver
the school district's essential strength: the court's willingness to cut it
some slack because of special educational circumstances and legitimate
pedagogical concerns arising in the school environment, and because
running these enterprises is left to the discretion ofthe local school boards
as outside the expertise of the court. Plaintiffs counsel will.have to take
75
the fight to the school boards.
n

.

.

E.g., Wilson v. I.B.M. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir. 1995).
74
E.g., Coil v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir. 1995); Celex

Group, Inc . v. Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1114, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
75
As a tactical matter, one might consider filing a cross-motion for s
· · judgment on one element that engenders synlPathy for the victim Preparing a well-founded
issue as a matter of law will at least detract some attention from the school district's
motion. One might also consider whether filing in state court might give a strategic
advantage on summary judgment. For exarnple, winning a motion for s ·
judgment
is harder in Indiana under Indiana Trial Rule 56 than under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 because the reasonable jury standard does not apply. Compare Anderson,
477 U.S. at 250, with Link v. Breen, 649 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

260

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY

(Vol. 29:243

The following are suggestions for gathering facts for and otherwise
preparing against stttnmaryjudgment and each element of a Title IX peer
sexual harassment case.

A. Hostile School Environment: Actionable
Harassme.n t and the Denial of Educational Benefits
Two elements of the prima facie peer sexual harassment case flow
seamlessly one into the other and thus are of that nature that is the bane
of a litigator's existence. Those elements are whether the harasser's
conduct was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and whether
such conduct prevented the victim from having equal access to the
educational opportunities offered by the school district. To the extent that
they cannot be unwound from each other-they pose more a recursive
cause-and-effect scenario rather than two discrete elements-proving one
or the other as distinct elements may be difficult. On the other hand, the
fact that they turn on each other could be to plaintiffs advantage by
presenting evidence that one element is so egregiously bad that, on
balance, the court will be more lenient on the matter ofproofofthe other.
Perhaps the best way to describe these two elements is the two steps
ofthe analysis for hostile environment: one is the objective and the other
76
is the subjective test. They constitute a type ofbalancing that suggests
that, if an objective view of the conduct is so egregious, less bad effects
are necessary and vice versa. Thrown into the mix of the subjective
analysis, however, is the arnount of frustration and fear engendered by
the school district's deliberate indifference to the matter. Sometimes, it
is just too much for a schoolchild to cope with by himself, especially if
one considers the special circumstances ofthe victims, children aged five
to eighteen.

The two elements are also an odd combination ofhostile environment
proof (th.e actionable conduct) and quid pro quo harassment proof {the
16

Cf. Anne-Marie Harris & Kenneth B. Grooms, A New Lesson Plan for Educational
Institutions: Expanded Rules Governing Liability Under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of1972for Student and Faculty Sexual Harassment, 8 AM .. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y &L. 575, 602 (2000) (asserting that Title IX sexual harassment follows Title
VII's objective-subjective analysis).

•
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adverse consequence) that Justice Kennedy distinguished in Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth:

11

Cases based on threats which [sic] are carried out are referred to often as
quidpro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks
that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.
The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful . . . in
making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out
and those where they are not or are absent altogether . . . . The principal
significance ofthe distinction is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either
explicit or constructive alterations in the tenns or conditions ofemployment
[quid pro quo] and to explain the latter must be severe or pervasive [hostile
78
work environment].
'

In El/erth, the Court actually backed away from the distinction between
the two types ofharassment in determining that an employee could bring
a Title VII sexual harassment claim against an employer for the acts of
its supervisor even without an adverse job consequence. As a result, an
employee does not have to prove "adverse, tangible job consequences"
when she refuses her supervisor's threatening and unwanted sexual
79
advances then sues her employer. Public school students, however, have
to prove characteristics of both: a hostile environment and an adverse
80
Together, however, they
effect as if it were a quid pro quo case.

524 u.s. 742 (1998)78 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751-52; see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 908-911; see generally
Stacey .R. Rinestine, Comment, Terrorism on the Playground: What Can Be Done?,
32 DUQ. L. REv. 799, 804-07 (1994).
79
The Court did, however, formulate an affirmative defense to such a suit if the
employer can prove that it exercised reasonable care in preventing or correcting such
behavior, and the harassed employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the
employer's efforts or otherwise to avoid the ham1. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S.
at 765~
80
Imagining a quid pro quo context for public schoolchildren is difficult because
such harassment is most associated with victims who perceive something to gain or to
lose from the sexual relationship. In institutions of higher education, the quid pro quo
analysis might work for teacher-on-student sexual harassment as an avenue to higher
grades. Similar concerns might motivate secondary school students (and maybe
precocious elementary students), but the younger the child, the less likely that quid pro
quo considerations are any factor. Less so is there any quid pro quo motivation to peer
sexual harassment.
77
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81

constitute the hostile environment proof that the plaintiff must present
to get beyond a motion for sutrunaryjudgment on this issue as well as the
82
first, the harasser's conduct.
Although one would think that its fact-specific nature would preclude
such use, the character ofthe harasser's conduct has often been the subject
of sun1mary judgment. And, on occasion, a school district has prevailed
83
on that issue.
One difficulty in developing evidence to a level sufficient to prove
actionable harassment is the vagueness of the adjectival phrase ''severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive." No precise meaning has been
attributed to these words in peer harassment cases, but the conduct must
be either sexually oriented or targeted at a victim because of gender.
Obviously, the sheer weight of evidence of harassing conduct can get a
plaintiff past summary judgment, not just the character of the conduct.
More specific guidance from the reported cases is scant; few Title IX
sexual harassment cases are reported. Thus, one might find analogous
hostile envirorunent analysis and proofin Title VII case law iffor no other
·reason than to attach meanings to "severe" and ''pervasive." However,
counsel must keep in mind that Title VII cases are disjunctive only one
needs to be proved-while Title IX cases are conjunctive; both must be
84
proved along ·with objective (not subjective) offensiveness.
81

See, e.g., Frazier, 276 F .3d at 52.
82
This test is not unlike the defmition of"hostile working environment" wtder Title
Vll: ''To establish hostile work environment, plaintiffs ~ .. must show harassing behavior
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [their] employment."'
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). Furthennore, "a sexually
objectionable enviromnent must be both 'Objectively and subjectively offensive, one that
a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did
perceive to be so." Faragherv. CityofBocaRaton, 524 U.S. 775,787 (1998) (citations
omitted).
83

See, e.g., Hawkins v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1288-89 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding that alleged behavior was not severe enough to have a "systernatic
effect" of denying girls access to an educational program as required under a Title IX
claim against the school district); Gabrielle M., 315 F .3d at 822; Cubie v. Bryan Career
Coli., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1203-04 (D. 'Kan. 2003).
84
See, e.g., Williams & Brake, supra note 39, at 442-56. If only for the minimal
rubric, Title Vll cases on sexual harassment are useful guides to Title IX analysis. /d.
at 442. But see Sasha Ransom, Comment, How Far Is Too Far? Balancing Sexual
Harassment Policies and Reasonableness in the Primary and Secondary Classrooms,
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What little can be gleaned from the reported Title IX cases is that the
harassment must be motivated by the victim's gender-on "the basis of
85
sex"-albeit not just "because of sex." When it comes to judging
students' conduct on the basis of gender, courts will obviou~ly view
behavior with overt sexual overtones as actionable misconduct; such as
rape, fondling, other forms of molestation, lewd remarks and acts,
sexually oriented touching, and even challenges to gender roles of
masculinity. Such behavior picks out a particular gender because ofthat
86
gender, not just because of sexuality. The individual markers of bad
conduct-severe, pervasive, objectively offensive-are also provable by
ex · · g the "constellation" ofsun·ounding circumstances espoused by
Justice O'Connor in Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board
81
ofEducation. That constellation analysis implies that any of the three
might have unequal weight to counterbalance the others, just as Title Vll
balances severity and pervasiveness: "[T]he more severe the conduct, the
less pervasive it need be to be actionable. Conversely, the more pervasive
88
the conduct, the less severe it need be to be actionable." Often,
actionable conduct must be "extremely serious," by review of the
"frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
89
physically threatening or h11tniliating." Although evidence a victim was
treated in a sexually subservient and demeaning fashion might be
91
90
enough, outright threatening and intimidating conduct and "discrimi27 Sw. U. L. REV~ 265,287-93 (1997) (arguing Title VII is "not the proper analog" for
student-on--student sexual harassment).
85
Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 526 U.S. 629t 651
(1999); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,78 (1998). Title IX
is framed on the "basis of sex'; and Title VII is framed around ''because of sex."
Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994). Oncale
identified.at least three motivations to prove sexual harassment is because ofsex: sexual
desire, hostilityto one gender, and discrimination toward one·gender. 523 U.S. at 80-81.
On the basis ofsex is vaguer.
86
See, e.g., Ca"oll K., 19 F. Supp. 2d at 621; see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904
(Title Vll).
87

526 u.s. 629 (1999).

88

Wilson v. S. Nat'l Bank ofN.C., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 803, 809 (W.D.N.C. 1995),
afFd, 92 F .3d 1184 (4th Cir. 1996).
89
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88 (citations omitted).
90

Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods.-, Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2003).

91

E.g., Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197-98 (D.R.I. 2003).
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92

natory intimidation, ridicule, and insults" are usually required in peer
sexual harassment cases, as discussed below.
The behavior must be objectively offensive as well, and in the Title
Vll context, that means that a reasonable person must find the behavior
93
offensive, or the conduct must be so "objectively offensive as to alter
94
the 'conditions' of the victim's employment." What student-plaintiffs
must override in the school district's side ofthe case-perhaps by affidavit
of an expert witness-is the notion that children cannot engage in sexual
harassment because they do not understand the seriousness of what they
are doing. The younger the child, the greater doubt a court might have
about whether the victim perceives the sexual nature of the alleged
harassment. Such slant to the evidence does not comport with the Davis
test because the behavior must be objectively offensive; subjectivity is
not the standard for judging peer sexual harassment under Title IX. In
addition, that notion flies in the face oflong-standing sexual harassment
theory that one can be harassed even ifsexual relations were voluntary-if
95
those relations were unwelcome. Thus, a special education student who
has been raped has still been subjected to sexual harassment regardless
ofher mental capacity. Similarly, youth and inunaturity should not shade
the objective offensiveness of the harasser's conduct.
Thus, a skeleton ofwhat constitutes actionable harassment comes into
view. Everyday pedestrian harassment and bullying will not trigger Title
96
IX. However, the spectrutn of evidence that would come within the

92

E.g., Ha"is, 510 U.S. at 21 (citations omitted); see Russell v. Midwest-Werner

& Pfleiderer, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 792, 797 (D. Kan. 1996).
93

Ha"is, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
94
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Ocheltree, 335 F .3d at 333.
9
s "But the fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual
harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen ofany sexual harassment claim
is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."' Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477
U.S. at 68; see also JOHN F. LEWIS & SUSAN C. HASTINGS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EDUCATION 9 (2d ed. 1994).
96
It is a bit disconcerting that Justice Kennedy, in dissent in Davis, seems to accept
the ''ubiquitous" nature ofbullying in schools as if it were an acceptable part ofgrowing
up. Davis, 526 U.S. at 677-78. "Ubiquitous" does not mean "innocuous." Bullying in
school has its own ramifications for schools and the law that protects children under their
supervisory care. See, e.g., Nan Stein, Bullying or Sexual Harassment? The Missing
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meaning of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive behavior could
be long and broad.
91
At one end of that spectrun1 is evidence like that alleged in Davis.
Fifth-grade LaShonda (and some ofher female classmates) were subjected
to several months' worth of the criminal antics of G.F. that included
98
offensive touching, lewd behavior, and verbal abuse. Similarly grim
evidence prompted the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Vance v.
Spencer County Public School District, to detennine that a female highschoolerundetwent sufficiently actionable bad conduct when she endured
99
repeated verbal and physical sexual harassment beginning in sixth grade.
That conduct included teasing and regular occurrences of being shoved
into walls while other students grabbed her book bag and made off with
100
She was stabbed in the hand by a male student who
her homework.
referred to the female students in physical education class as "whores''
101
and "motherfuckers. "
Some students called her crude names while
102
others grabbed at her hair and tore her shirt. In still other instances,
103
students fondled her breasts and buttocks and requested sexual favors.
Of a similarly prolonged and pervasive nature was the ordeal in Doe
v. Londonderry School District, during which a seventh-grade girl was
subjected to increasingly hostile verbal assaults, threats of retaliation if
she reported the behavior, physical contact, abusive telephone calls to her
home, a pornographic cartoon depicting her engaged in anal sex, and

Discourse ofRights in an Era ofZero Tolerance, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 783 (2003); Daniel
B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and
Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 641 (2004).

However, bullying is an antecedent to peer sexual harassment. NAN STEIN, CLASSROOMS
& COURTROOMS: FACING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN K-12 SCHOOLS 49-50 (1999).
97

526 u.s. 629.

98

Davis, 526 U.S. at 629.
99
231 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2000). The Vance case actually went to trial, but the
school district appealed from the court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter
of law, the post-verdict equivalent of a motion for summary judgment.
100
/d. at 256.
101 /d.
102 /d.
103

/d. at 257.
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104

being hit with a piece of meat covered with a sexuallubricant.
Likewise, a young male student avoided summary judgment on evidence that,
while he was in fifth, sixth, and seventh grades, fellow students inflicted
a prolonged batTage of verbal abuse because ofhis stance in favor of gay
105
rights.
He was called "little fag," "queer," "little faggy queero," and
106
"little bitch" by both male and female students.
He was involved in
nun1erous fights, including one occasion during which his face was
pushed into a bus window and he was told to "'(k]iss it, you little fag.
107
Kiss it. '" Two older students even accosted him in the bathroom and
108
slammed his head into a urinal, chipping his tooth.
Widespread verbal abuse got past a motion for summary judgment
when high school basketball team members constantly harassed a pair
ofbrothers by challenging their masculinity: they were called "Stiffy'' and
"Little Stiffy," "fag," "homo," and "jewboy," and endured other com109
ments suggesting the boys were homosexual.
Further evidence of
severe, pervasive, and offensive conduct have included teasing that
110
escalated to assault and battery, multiple instances of assault and bat112
tery111 that include fondling and verbal abuse, sexual verbal com114
113
ments, and multiple sexual assaults.
These exaznples certainly

104

970 F. Supp. 64, 66-68 (D.N.H. 1997), modified on other grounds, 32 F. Supp.
2d 1360 (D.N.H. 1997) (pre-Davis).
105
Schroeder, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 871-72.
106
/d. at 870-71.
107
/d. at 879.
108
Id. at 871.
109
Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL
276975, at *1 (D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001). The brothers were also subjected to physical
abuse during the course of basketball practices, which the coaches ignored.
110
Ray, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1167, 1170.
111
Ca"o/1 K., 19 F. Supp. 2d at 620-21 (pre-Davis).
112
Haines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (pre-Davis).
113
Jacqueline M. ex rei. Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369,
1372 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (pre-Davis). "The harassment consisted of unwanted verbal
comments regarding plaintitrs breasts and figure in general, and on one occasion
involved a male student touching plaintiff's breast during class." /d.
114
Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1243-44, 1248.
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evidence both the pervasiveness and severity that would entitle a plaintiff
to Title IX remedies for peer sexual harassment.
However, at the other end of the spectrum are stories of conduct that
are a tad more vague, that do not quite seem to prick at a court's conscience as the preceding cases did. For instance, in Gabrielle M v. Park
Forest-Chicago Heights; Illinois School District 163, one .problematic
male kindergarten student, Jason, engaged in fairly randy behavior from
115
his first day in school. Jason jumped on Gabrielle's back during recess
and leaned against her while holding his crotch, apparently habitual recess
116
On
behavior that also included kissing his little female classmates.
more than one occasion, he unzipped his pants when the teacher was not
looking and exposed his underpants to his classmates!'' Jason and
another classmate were caught with their hands down each other's
118
pants.
These specific incidents were deemed not of a sexual nature
because the "children ... were not engaging in knowingly sexual acts,
a fact that (at a minimum) detracts from the severity and offensiveness
119
oftheir actions." And the evidence that might have borne some sexual
connotation was clothed in Gabrielle's kindergarten parlance, that Jason
"bothered" her, did "nasty stuff' and wanted to spend recess time playing
.

'

315 F!3d 817, 818-19 (7th Cir. 2003).
116
Gabrielle M, 315 F.3d at 818-19.
117
/d. at 819.
118 /d.
liS

119

/d. at 822-23. But see Borrero v. Collins Bldg. Servs., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6885
(AGS), 2002 WL 31415511 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2002) (sbnilarbehaviorwas objectively
and subjectively offensive under Title VII). 'When dealing with very young children,

at least one court ruled that vague allegations ofsimilar behavior did not reach the level
ofproofnecessary foractionable sexual harassment because the children were "unaware"
of the sexual nature of the conduct. Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 823. 'l'his conclusion
was premised upon the evidence ofthe schoolpsychologist and should prompt the good
litigatQr to prepare one's own expert and challenge the relevance ofsuch evidence. The
test is not whether the children believed they were engaging in sexual behavior; the test
is whether the objective observer would think so. One of the strictures of Davis is that
the children's subjective concerns about the behavior are not at issue when they must
be "objectively offensive." See Davis ex rei. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629 ( 1999). Furthetinore, the te.rtns often used by elementary students
for gender bullying behavior will sound more likerun-of-the...mill bullying behavior than
sexual harassment. The latter concepts do not compute, although ''pestering,'' "annoying," "bothering," "hassling," and ''bugging" might. STEIN, supra note 96, at 61-.62.
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120

with her in ''' funny ways." This evidence was too vague and unspecific
121
to defeat the school district's motion for summary judgment.
Similar acts of prolonged and pervasive teasing, nattle-calling, and
general botherment between seven-year-olds are not enough to constitute
severe, pervasive, and objectionably offensive sexual harassment
122
conduct. And lest one suspect that problems-of proof occur only with
younger children, the same resulted at the secondary level when male high
123
school students called a female student ''slut," "bitch,'' and "puss[y]."
This verbal harassment was not deemed sexual harassment because,
according to the court, it occurred duringthe course of a running dispute
124
fueled by personal animus, not sex. Even an incident of oral and anal
sex upon a special education student was not sufficiently egregious
conduct because there was no proofofpervasive gender-related harass125
ment, despite a history of teasing and bullying. Thus, the other end of
the spectrum seems inhabited by behavior that might be classified as more
innocuous teasing or incidents that courts believe are unrelated. to sex.
Plaintiffs evidence might fit within an exception to the mere teasing
end of the spectrum if it were prolonged and systemic. Evidence of a
long-term pattern ofname-calling, teasing, and crude sexual gestures was
sufficient to survive summary judgment in Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified
126
School District No. 464. The harassment took place over a four-year
period, and

120

Gabrielle M, 315 F.3d at 822.

121

/d.

Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. ofEduc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447, 454 (S.D.N~Y.
2000). The court left unresolved whether a single incident of the harasser's having put
his hand between the victim's legs and briefly touching her v:agina was sufficient, as it
would be in the workplace. /d. at 454-55.
..

22

123

Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. HighSch.Dist No.303, 213 F. Supp. 2d 917,919 (C.D.
Ill. 2002).
124

/d. at 930-931. "Damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and natnecalling among school children, however, even where these comments target differences
in gender." /d. at 931. (emphasis in original).
125
Wilson v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist, 144 .F. Supp. 2d 690,691,694 (E.D. Tex.
2001).
126
377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 977 (D. Kan. 2005) (Theno 1).
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the bulk of the more severe harassment traced its origins back to the rumor
that began when plaintiffwas in seventh grade that he was caught rnasturbating in the bathroom. The fact that plaintiffs peers made crude drawings and
teased him because he was perceived to be a masturbator, when combined
with arguably related crude name-calling, reflects that plaintiffs harassers
believed that he did not conform to male stereotypes by not engaging in such
127
behavior at school, i.e., that he did not act as a man should act

Whether this case was the exception because it involved a male student
rather than a female student remains to be tested.
Obviously, the more evidence of sexually charged behavior that is
available, the better it is for the plaintiff. That is not to say that a lesser
level of proof might not win out; however, as school districts continue
to challenge all aspects of the prima facie peer sexual harassment case,
plaintiffs counsel is best served by accumulating as much evidence as
possible for the eventual and dreaded motion for sutnmary judgment. Of
some help is the conjunction of the nature of the conduct with its related
element, its effect on the victim.
Under Title IX, sexually harassing behavior must have a "systemic
effect of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or
128
activity. "
This element is obviously related to Title Vll analysis in
which the behavior "must be extreme to atnount to a change in the terms
129
and conditions of employment." However, student-on-student sexual

127

Theno /, 3 77 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (emphasis in original); see also Doe ex rel. Doe
v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 {N.D. Cal. 1993), reconsideration
granted by949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (pre-Davis). In the Petaluma case, the
plaintiff was subjected to sexually charged verbal abuse throughout seventh and eighth
grade and alleged facts sufficient to suggest to the court that she might have a case for
hostile environment sexual harassment. Beginning with the innocuous statement, "I hear
you have a hot dog in your pants," rumors spread by both male and female students about
the plaintiff's having had sex with a hot dog. Classmates started to call her "hot dog
bitch," "slut" and "ho" and wrote comments on the bathroom walls every day, such as
"Jane is a hot dog bitch." /d. at 1564-66; see also Sarah Diane Stevenson, The Revenge
of the Hot Dog Slut. Peer Harassment After Davis v. Monroe, 10 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 137 (2000).
128
Davis, 526 U.S. at 652.
129
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Similarly, the Court
has defmed actionable sexual harassment under Title VII as being "sufficiently severe
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of[the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environrnent. ,, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 67.
4
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harassment takes a somewhat narrower view of the end result. Such a
narrow view might be the result of the Court's failing to inquire whether
the victim subjectively believed she was being harassed. The view-might
also be narrowed because of the Court's perspective that peer sexual
harassment is "less likely'' to deny equal access opportunities than
teacher-on-student sexual harassment. t.lo
Perhaps because of the specialized school environment, the Court
might have felt constrained in deciding what evidence did or did not
constitute a denial ofequal access to educational opportunity. Whatever
the reason, the evidentiary burden. for this element is pretty v.ague in
Davis. Outright deprivation ofphysical access to educational opportuni131
ties is not required, but further direction is lacking. The problem thus
becomes .determining what evidence will prove that the severity and
pervasiveness of the harassment undermined and detracted from the
132
educational experience. Evidence of a mere drop in grades may not
be enough to stave off a motion for sumntary judgment on this element,
but Justice 0 'Connor does not foreclose victory ifthat evidence combines
133
with the persistence and .severity of the actionable conduct itself.
Whatever the source, the impact should have a "concrete, negative effect
134
on [the victim's] ability to receive an education'' in line with the theme
of educational equality contained in Title IX; the victim must show a
distinct connection between the behavior and the resultant problems in
school. One might suggest that this element is the equivalent ofthe TitleVll analysis ofthe subjective perception ofthe victim, especially for those
students who cannot articulate a sexual aspect to the harassment.
Obviously, a motion .for summary judgment will have a greater
likelihood of success when the effect of the harassment is worse. For
example, in Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Board of Education, a secondgrader did not provide adequate evidence that she suffered adverse effects
.

130

.

Davis, 526 U.S. at 653.
131
See id. at 651.
132 .
•
.
See 1d. at 650-5 1.
133
See id. at 652. Grades are the work-product for this workplace of public school
students. Students usually do notview a drop in grades as being mere~ Too much rides
on academic success to be cavalier about grades in this manner.
134
/d. at 654.
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from a classmate's sexual harassment when she passed all her courses
135

Panic
and could not connect her absences to the alleged harassment.
attacks that could not be directly linked to the offensive conduct were not
of sufficiently deleterious effect when the alleged victim satisfactorily
136
completed her exa1ns and was elected student of the month. The case
ofHawkins v. Sarasota County School Board held that none ofthe alleged
victims were denied equal access to educational opportunity when they
suffered no decline in grades and suffered no observable behavioral
137
changes.
Such evidence may not be enough to avoid summary
138
judgment.
In contrast, evidence of a denial of access to education seems directly
linked to the pervasiveness of the harassing conduct such that proof of
one is proof of the other: the more the better. For instance, Alma
McGowen was subjected to numerous physical and verbal attacks that
resulted in her being diagnosed with depression and settling for being
39
schooled at home..l Similarly, Jesse Montgomery experienced systemic
problems with same-sex sexual harassment that deprived him ofphysical
access to the educational programs when, for years, he feared using the
school's restroom and "avoided eating in the cafeteria, riding the school
140
bus, orparticipating:in intramural sports._'' Although his grades did not
particularly suffer,-the district court determined that the activities from
which he felt excluded were benefits of the educational program, and he
141
thereby experienced substantial interference with his education. For
us 94 F. Supp. 2d at 45 5. In addition, she had not met with a psychologist until after
her mother had retained counsel. /d. at 451-52.-Similarly, Gabrielle M. did not "suffer~"
Although Gabrielle was diagnosed with some psychological problems, her grades
re-mained steady and she did not experience serious absenteeism. See Gabrielle M.., 31 S
F.3d at 823.

See Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No~ 47, 194 F. Supp. 2d 939, 946 (D. Minn.
2002)t
.
136

137
138

322 F. 3d at 1289.

Although the victims asserted they ·were upset, they did not report the problems
to their parents until several months later. See id. Their absences from school were
deterrnined to have no probative value when two had faked illness to avoid going to
school for four or five days. See id.
139
Vance, 231 F.3d at 257, 259.
140
Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
141 /d.
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two brothers, summary judgment was granted when widespread sexual
harassment by fellow students and some coaches went "far beyond"
142
teasing. Another victim was "totally deprived" ofeducational benefits
by the actionable sexual harassment of a fellow student when she becarne
suicidal and engaged in self-destructive behavior, causing her to be
143
institutionalized and later home-bound. Therefore, proof of physical
school avoidance is clearly useful when added to the psychological
reactions.
However, an adverse psychological reaction may be enough as a
measure of the victim's subjective reaction. A demonstration of such
psychological trautna sufficient to deny a student access to educational
opportunities was the subject in Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified School
144
District No. 464. In Theno, the victim was torttlented for four years
by his fellow students, routinely called "fag," "faggot," "jack-offboy,"
145
''banana boy," "queer," "flatner," or "masturbator." He was the subject
of crude drawings and conunents that reinforced the belief that he was
146
gay. As a result ofthis continuous and unrelenting torment, he suffered
stomach problems and depression that required medication and counseling.147 He was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety
disorder, and avoidant personality disorder, and he eventually left
148
school. The school district's motion for summary judgment on this
149
issue was denied, and the plaintiff eventually won a $250,000 verdict
against the school district.
If any trend can be found in these cases, it is the overwhelming
magnitude of the evidence that a plaintiff must bring to a motion for

142

Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *5.
143
Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1244, 1248-49.
144
377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 (D. Kan. 2005) (Theno 1).
14
s Theno I, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
146
/d. at 965, 968.
147
/d. at 968.
148 /d.
•

149

/d. at976; Thenov. Tonganoxie UnifiedSch. Dist. No. 464,394 F. Supp. 2d 1299
(D. Kan. 2005) (Theno II). But see Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 931-32 (female student
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress syndrome was not denied educational opportunities
when she achieved her highest grades in high school during the problematic semester).
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sunnnary judgment for both elements. To create a genuine issue of
material fa.c t about the harassing conduct, a victim usually must prove
more than a single incident. That evidence can be other than just
sexually-oriented behavior; it can also be teasing and pervasive harassment targeted at a particular gender. Also, in line with these cases, a
plaintiff should show some quantitative psychological harn1, especially
in the absence of de facto physical exclusion from the educational
program. Although one would think that any child's aversion to school
caused by fear would be actionable, some cases suggest otherwise.
Something more than just being afraid of one's everyday envirorunent
is required. Such judicial attitude ignores the fact that these students are
''twice-victimized": they are victims ofharassing behavior and ofa denial
of "their rights to a quality education in a tranquil learning environ150
ment. " Unless and until some plaintiff can create that theme in a Title
IX peer sexual harassment case, which is not unlike the hostile environment that is actionable under Title Vll, children are going to have a much
harder time showing how they have suffered in their own workplace,
especially in the absence of a clearly articulated, objective test of the
harassment.

B. See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Actual Knowledge
This next element ofthe Title IX peer sexual harassment test involves
a much simpler task. Who knew what, and when did he know it? Davis
is not terribly enlightening in the matter of the school district's "actual
151
knowledge" or its response to uknown acts of sexual harassment."
Indeed, the school district's knowledge was not at issue in Davis. How152
ever, according to Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,
actual knowledge is the ultimate hook that makes a school district liable
under Title IX and not of mere vicarious liability that might otherwise
arise from an employment situation or some other type of custodial

150

See SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra note 66, at 109.
tst See, e.g., Joan E. Schaffner, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education: The
Unresolved Questions, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 79) 87-90 (2000).
ISl 524 U.S. 274, 288 (1998).
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control-agency relationship that creates liability for student-on-student
153
sexual harassment.
Also unlike the Gebser decision, Davis does not instruct that actual
knowledge must be possessed by a school district official with authority
154
That distinction is likely because, when
to take corrective action.
dealing with the custodial-control aspect of a school district, almost any
school official, whether teacher, adtninistrator, or school board member,
ostensibly has the supervisory power to take the corrective action
necessary between and a1nong students to keep from being deliberately
indifferent. tss At the very least, proof must show that the victim advised
at least one ofthese categories ofofficials because their actions likely can
be attributed to the statutory recipient of federal funds for Title IX
56
liability_l This custodial control arises because schools are typically
157
charged with a duty of supervision. The supervisory requirement can
158
vary by the age of the children and be heightened by knowledge of
159
dangerous conditions in the school. Therefore, if a victim wants to
assure that someone in authority has actual knowledge, that individual
will likely need to possess "the authority to halt known abuse, perhaps
by measures such as transferring the harassing student to a different class,
suspending hirn, curtailing his privileges, or providing additional supervision."160
Such direct knowledge might be derived from school officials' actual
observation, students' formal and infotmal reports, and from bystanders'

1 3

'

s See Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-48.

154

See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289-90.
•ss This differs from teacher-on-student harassment where the notified official must
have authority over the harassing teacher.
156
See, e.g., Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247; Schaffner, supra note 151, at 87-88.
157
See, e.g., Miller v. Griesel, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706-07 (Ind. 1974); Sheehan v. St.
Peter's Catholic Sch., 188 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1971); see also Davis, 526 U.S.
at 644.
138
See, e.g., Johnson ex rei. Johnson v. Sch. Dist. ofMillard, 573 N.W .2d. 116, 119
(Neb. 1998).
159

See, e.g., Dixon v. Chi. Bd. ofEduc., 710 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999);
Johnson v. City ofBoston, 490 N.E.2d 1204, 1206-07 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
160
Mu"ell, 186 F.3d at 1247; see also Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *5 .
•
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161

reports. The very nature of the educational environment suggests that
notice can be transmitted in any number of ways in order to be found
162
acceptable. Schools must be flexible, particularly because children are
less likely than employees to tell a school authority figure they have been
sexually harassed. Instead, children are more likely to tell a friend or
163
familymember. Although one decision determined that mere observa164
tion is not enough without a particular report, the required supervisory
duties of school officials suggest that seeing is believing. Even though
actionable peer sexual harassment does not have an explicit subjective
component, school observers must use their objective antennae when
165
confronted with untoward behavior that the victim is not enjoying.
Combining students' itmnaturitywith their innate fear ofschool administrators, teacher observers are the front-line of protection. Accordingly,
a school district's motion to dismiss was denied on the strength of
evidence that a teacher witnessed a playground incident that amounted
to sexual harassment, because the teacher had supervisory authority at
166
the time and failed to intervene.
But a teacher's knowledge of
nonspecific and generally problematic misconduct may not be actual
167
knowledge of sexual harassment.

161

Davies, supra note 32, at 423.
162
See id.
163

AM.Ass'NoFUNIVERSITYWOMENEoucATIONALFOUNDATION,HosTILEHALLwAvs: BULLYING, TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 29-30 (2001),

available at http://www.aauw.orglmember_center/publications!HostileHallwayslhostile
hallways.pdf[hereinafter 2001 HOSTILE HALLWAvs]. Only 11% ofboth physically and
non-physically harassed students were likely to tell a teacher, while 9% were likely to
tell another school employee. /d.
164

See Winzer v. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac, 105 F. App'x 679, 681 (6th Cir. 2004)
(principal aware that middle school students were engaging in sexual activity on school
grounds but did not know that it was not consensual; therefore he had no actual notice
of sexual harassment); see also Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 608-09.
16
' See Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464,394 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (D.
Kan. 2005). But see Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 823 (finding that near constant supervision of kindergartners is insufficient to constitute actual knowledge of harassment
unless observation of actual sexual harassment occurs).
166
Carroll K., 19 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22; see also Mu"ell, 186 F.3d at 1248.
167
Gabrielle M., 315 F.3d at 823-24.
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The safest route to recovery is for the victim to have informed a school
168
administrator, and not just a teacher, of the acts ofharassment. - This
notice should have sufficient specificity so that the school district can
169
actually take action. In these cases, a victim's parent typically calls a
170
school principal to discuss the harassment, makes repeated reports to
171
the teachers and the principal, calls the principal and the superin172
17
tendent, or calls the principal and the assistant principal. 3. A victimlitigant who has not reported the harassment at all or cannot otherwise
prove that school officials had actual knowledge of the conduct to do
something _
about it likely will not prevaiL Reb·uilding the chronology
would be useful, and the higher the reports went the better. Some severe
and pervasive conduct might be sufficiently reported if teachers or
administrators actually observed the behavior. However, the best
evidence remains a recounting and chronology of the victim's and her
parents' reports to both.

C. Do No Evil: Deliber-a te Indifference
Oddly enough, proving deliberate indifference has been problematic
in getting past a motion for summary judgment due in no small measure
to the great deference courts traditionally bestow on school districts'
policy actions. "Courts should refrain from second-guessing the
168

Schaffner, supra note 151, at 90. "By requiring that the 'appropriate person' be
an 'official' and by·requiring that that person have at a 'minimum'· authority to institute
corrective measures, it is more likely that the Davis Court intended that the principal
have actual notice of peer sexual harassment before liability under Title IX may be
unposed upon the recipient." /d. (citation omitted).
169
See Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 607-08.
170
Mun"e/1, 186 F.3d at 1247-48.
171
Vance, 231 F.3d at 259; see also Morlock v. W. Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp.
2d. 892,908-09 (D. Minn. 1999) (pre-Davis) (attributing actual knowledge to teacher,
technical tutor, and the Title IX coordinator, a building principal "equivalent" in special
education district).
172
Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *6.
173
Schroeder, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 880. School board members likely do not have
to have actual knowledge. !d. But see Rasnick, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (holding that
the school board is not liable under Title IX because the division superintendent lacked
authority to take action on behalf of the school board against the harassing teacher).
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disciplinary decisions made by school adt11inistrators. " This deference
arises from the power given to local school boards to control and manage
175
the affairs of local education. Thus, prevailing at the sununary judgment level on this element can be difficult for victim-litigants because
of schools' discretion in matters of discipline and management.
Deliberate indifference seems to be the other hook for Title IX liability
under the contractual theory set out in Gebser. In response to known
teacher-on-student sexual harassment, a school district's deliberate
indifference must amount to an official decision not to remedy a Title IX
176
violation.
Although Davis is not especially illuminating on the
177
matter, peer sexual harassment prompts a somewhat lower standard of
care. A school district is not charged with
· g to eradicate peer
harassment by implementing preventive codes ofconduct. It will be held
liable ''where the [school's] response to the harassment or lack thereof
178
is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances."
That
might mean more than recklessness but is at least a failure to act in the
179
face ofcertain or substantial certainty ofstudent hatm. It clearly means
174

Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 n.9

(1985)).
17
'

Bd. ofEduc., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26, 451 U.S. at 863-64.
But that is a double-edged sword: schools are charged with teaching "the shared values
of a civilized social order, so they have the power to limit certain offensive student
conduct that might otherwise be constitutionally protected. Bethel Scb. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675', 683-84 (1986) (stating that a school has the authority to limit
and/or discipline the use of lewd, wlgar, and offensive language). Those limits of this
special educational environment are vaguely defmed as those that are "reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273. With that
power and responsibility, does not a school district have a concomitant, heightened
responsibility to teach such "civilized social order" when local school employees have
actual knowledge of peer sexual harassment? Perhaps not. School-initiated decisions
limiting students' freedoms seem to be given greater deference than school failures to
·
protect their students.
176

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
tn Schaffner, supra note 151, at 90 (stating that it remains unclear from Davis
"whether notice ofpeer sexual harassment to an individual teacher satisfies the Gebser
standard," that is, whether an individual teacher is an official with authority to address
and correct the harassment); see generally Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 612.
178
Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
179
The Sixth Circuit approved the following language in the jury instructions given
in Vance:
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something more than just an explicit institutional decision to ignore
180
harassment but might impose something less than the duty of an
181
employer to its employee.
Evidence ofdeliberate indifference to overcome a motion for sununary
judgment is not evidence of intent to discriminate but rather evidence that
182
proves causation ofharassment and appears to have the following three
stages. (1) Did the school investigate properly? (2) If it did investigate,
183
did it implement remediation? (3) If it did remediate, was it effective?
Therefore, this evidence has the flavor of causation in it. To be held
liable, what did the school fail to do that promoted a violation of its Title
184
IX duties? The focus then is detennining when a school's response is
clearly unreasonable.
As for the first two rhetorical questions, an official response necessarily starts with the Department of Education's Sexual Harassment
185
Guidance. This requires that,
"Deliberate Indifference" means more than mere "recklessness" on the part of the
appropriate person. "Recklessness" requires only proof that a reasonable person
would have appreciated the great degree of risk of haran to the plaintiff. In order
for an act to be "deliberate," the particular appropriate person must have been shown
to have been aware that adverse consequences from his or her action were certain
or substantially certain to cause the hann. Before you can find that any appropriate
person was deliberately indifferent, the plaintiff must prove that the appropriate
person was aware that aparticular act or inaction was certain or substantially certain
to cause the Plaintiff harm and that the appropriate person decided to act or not to
act in spite of that knowledge.

231 F.3d at 263-64.
180
See Davies, supra note 32, at 427-31.
181
Deborah L. Brake, School Liability for Peer Sexual Harassment After Davis:
Shifting from Intent to Causation in Discrimination Law, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
5, 25-29 (2001).
182
/d. at 22-23.
183

See generally Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at 612-16 (discussing the "deliber-

ate indifference" concept).
184
"[T]he implicit theory of discrimination underlying the Davis decision [is] that
schools cause the discrimination by exacerbating the harn1 that results from sexual
harassment by students." Brake, supra note 181, at 6.
185

OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP 'T OF EDUCATION, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR
THIRD PARTIES {200 1), available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archiveslshguide/
index.html [hereinafter REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE].
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[o]nee a school has notice of possible sexual harassment of students ... it
should take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise
detennine what occurred and take prompt and effective steps reasonably
calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile environment ifone has
186
been created, and prevent harassment from occurring again.

In illustration, a principal's failure to investigate allegations of sexual
187

harassment is deliberate indifference.
Likewise, a principal and
assistant principal who did nothing after a report of sexual harassment
"fostered an environment in which such harassment was accepted, and
188
which made [the victim] more vulnerable to further harassment." In
another case, a principal not only did not investigate the victims' complaints, he told one victim that the nicknames and physical abuse that he
189
endured were "a part of growing up and should be tolerated. " Similar
indifference was exhibited by teachers who had actual knowledge ofthe
alleged harassment and attempted to conceal it by advising the disabled
190
victim not to tell her mother. Thus, lack of investigation and failure
to implement any remedy are the frrst avenues of proof for the victim.
The third question examines post-investigation remediation. A court
will also measure the efficacy of the remedy; doing something is not
enough. "[W]here a school district has knowledge that its remedial action
is inadequate and ineffective, it is required to take reasonable action in
191
light ofthose circutnstances to eliminate the behavior." Merely talking
to the offending students without any further discipline or reports to law
enforcement ofphysical abuse may be deliberate indifference in continuing to employ obviously ineffective methods to stop unrelenting harass-

186

!d. at 15-16. The Department ofEducation has recommended investigations since
the issuance of its 1997 version of the Guidance. Harris & Grooms, supra note 76, at
615-16 (citations omitted). The victim must also cooperate with the investigation. See
Johnson, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 947-48.
187

Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248.
188
Schroeder, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 880.
189
Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, at *6. Even after the victims' parents met with the
superintendent, and the superintendent issued an action memo to the principal, the
principal did nothing. !d. at •6-7.
190
Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248.
191
Vance, 231 F.3d at 261.
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192

rnent.
Likewise, doing too little of more substantial disciplinary
measures may also be deliberate indifference. Even though a school took
some steps to stop the harassment by suspending and expelling some
offending students, the evidence revealed that the harassment was "open,
recurring, and frequently tolerated'' by school officials. The evidence also
revealed that school officials told the victim that nothing could be done
and advised her to tolerate it. This incomplete remedy was deliberate
193
indifference in the face of pervasive sexual harassment. Thus, school
district liability may still accrue if individual disciplinary actions are not
194
enough to stop the hostile environment experienced by a victim.
The school district;s remedy to overcome the deliberate indifference
hurdle must be related to the severity of the harassment. For example,
a school district did not display deliberate indifference when its ·remedy
for unremitting teasing included "counseling [the victim], me·eting with
the offending students, sending letters to parents, threatening suspension,
195
and alerting teachers to the problem." Further evidence of a lack of
deliberate indifference might include meting out discipline after each
event and taking similar steps to prevent future harassment. In one such
case, the school disciplined a harassing kindergartner with suspension
from recess privileges, detention, transfer to another classroom, isolation,
and an adjustment of lunchroom schedules to separate him from the
victims. The school called the parents, and the school psychologist met
with the students. Eventually, the alleged victim was allowed to transfer
/d. at 262. Indeed, the ~'talking-to" method only increased the harassment. /d.
193
Morlock, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 909-10. See also Montgomery v. Independent School
District No. 709, where modest action by the school administration was not enough
remediation for a ten·yearpattem ofharassment. 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. The victim
alleged that he had made "hundreds of complaints about the harassment to school
teachers, cafeteria and playground monitors, <
bus drivers, principals, assistant principals,
locker room attendants, counselors, and even the superintendent." /d. The evidence
on summary judgment indicated that other than verbal reprimands or sending a harasser
out to the hall, not much else was done to stop the harassment. By the time the victim
finally filed a formal complaint, the school suspended several of the offending students
but not the most egregious offenders. I d. at 1086.
194
E.g., Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1299,
1311 (D. Kan. 2005); Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp.
2d 9'52, 976-77 (D. Kan. 2005)
19
' Biggs v. Bd. ofEduc. of Cecil County, Md., 229 F. Supp. 2d 437,445 (D. Md.
2002).
192
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196

to avoid any contact even during recess. These acts were not clearly
unreasonable responses to the problem, and there was no deliberate
197
indifference.
The insunnountable evidence for a victim in a p.eer harassment case
is a school district's systemic response to a problem. A school administra~
tion that has made a concerted effort to change the environment itselfmay
prevail on sununary judgment even ifthe victim claims the response was
198
not 100% perfect. Evidence ofresponse to the systemic problem might
include not just watning students but also counseling and suspending
offenders, circulating memoranda to faculty and staff to prevent further
·harassment ofthe victim, training faculty and staff, and creating school199
sponsored ass.emblies and policies to address peer harassment.
Victim-litigants must understand that no court is likely to detertnine
they are entitled to the perfect remedy, particularly in light of the
200
harassing student's own rights. Separating and giving the students a
"talking-to" (rather than expulsion) may be a sufficiently reasonable
201
response when a male student is annoying a female student. Indeed;
not every complaint may even require. an investigation if the school
officials doubt the report's credibility, especially ifthe school administra202
tors actually follow up with the accused .students and warn them off.
The foregoing analysis should warn plaintiffs counsel that this last
element in the prima facie case is the most deceptively difficult to
196

Gabri~lle M., 315 F.3d at 820.

197

/d. at 823-25.

198

Doe v. Bellefonte Area Sch. Dist., 106 F. App'x 798, 799-800 (3d Cir. 2004).
199
/d. at 800. Several systemic prevention prograuts and curricular guides are
available. See, e.g., JUDITH BERMAN BRANDENBURG, CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: WHAT SCHOOLS & COLLEGES CAN DO 66-96 ( 1997); SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra
note 66, at 141-59, 173-239.
200
. •
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
•
See Davzs, 526 U.S. at 649; see .also Johnson, 194 F. Supp. 2d .a t 947; Sonano
ex rel. Garcia v. Bd. ofEduc. ofN.Y., 2004 WL 2397610, at •4-5 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
201
.
Cubie, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (holding that a business college did not actwith
deliberate indifference in a matter of a male student paying unwanted attention to a
female student, and the female student was not entitled to the male student's expulsion
when the college administration met with the male student and discussed the female
student's concerns, notified instructors ofthe problem, and coordinated class breaks so
the students would not be in contact with each other).
202
Burwell, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 933-34.
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overcome on summaryjudgment. The challenge is the deference a court
is likely to give a school district in matters of discipline. To the extent
that the school district's proof in opposition is overborne by the weight
ofthe victim's subjective psychological and physical alienation from the
educational environment, the deliberate indifference standard might be
tlJmed on a school district: too little is not good enough. However, all
four of these elements clearly are affected by the special environment in
which the harassment takes place.

III. Educating the Litigator:
Title IX and the School Environment
In any education case, a couple of truisms stand out. The first truism
was addressed in the Introduction: public schools are a unique environ~
ment. Unfottunately, many lawyers taking on such cases are woefully
ignorant ofthat environment, often to their own chagrin and school board
counsel's glee. School litigation reflects this special environment both
for its very existence and by reason ofcase law that has developed during
the past century. That environment is special because of the nature ofthe
business an,d the age ofthe clientele, and even conventional tort and civil
rights theories must be molded to acconm1odate that environment. As
a consequence, any successful party to a Title IX peer sexual harassment
case prevails because of a conjunction of greater knowledge of that
environment and, to a lesser extent, the court's lack of that knowledge
and therefore inherent deference to the party exhibiting the greater
expertise.
The second truism is that defense counsel for the schools, whether
insurance or school board counsel, often have significantly more
experience in this specialized area oflitigation than plaintiff lawyers, even
if they specialize in tort or civil rights litigation. Even if they have not
actually tried that many cases under Title IX, school <
board lawyers are
more fluent in the lingo and more attuned to the specialized constitutional
issues than plaintiff lawyers. Furthermore, they have a great support
network in the National School Boards Association; this is the environment in which school board lawyers make their living. Plaintiff lawyers,
on the other <
hand, are often engaged in a one-off case in an area fraught
with problems they have not bothered to educate themselves about. That
is a mistake.
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There are at least five specific areas to which counsel in these Title
IX cases must be attuned. The first two areas were addressed at length
in Parts I and IT: The frrst is that the bounds for a plaintiffs succeeding
in a peer sexual harassment case are extremely naiTOW, making it difficult
to win. Second, these cases are usually challenged right out of the box,
requiring a plaintiff to be fully and immediately prepared for the inevitable motion for S11mmary judgment. That leads to the other three crucial
areas to which counsel should be attentive: (a) understanding the school
environment vis avis student sexual harassment, (b) und.erstanding the
dynamics of childhood and adolescent sexuality and gender identity and
how they relate to Title IX litigation, and (c) creating litigation themes
for casting a plaintiffs case in the best light.

A. The Horse that Has Left the Barn: The School
Environment and Peer Sexual Harassment
Regardless ofwhether a court has faced a Title IX peer sexual harassment case before, it must be convinced that it is not a new problem-a
difficult problem perhaps but not a novel one. Title IX's prohibition
receiving federal funds
against sex discrimination in educational pro
203
has been in place since 1972. Granted, private causes of action under
Title IX for sexual harassment have a much shorter pedigree, only show204
ing up in federal courts around the mid-1990s and finally receiving the
Supreme Court's imprimatur in 1998 with Gebser and the recognition
205
of a right of action for teacher-on-student sexual harassment. Just a
year later, the Court recognized peer sexual harassment causes of action
206
in Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board ofEducation.
However, the United States Department of Education's Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) was on the ball and issued its Sexual Harassment Guidance
203

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U .S.C. § 1681.
204
See, e.g., Doe v. .Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997);
Burrow ex rei. Burrow v. Postville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1199 (N.D.
Iowa 1996).
205
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285.
. .
526 u.s. 629, 633 (1999).
2~
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207

in 1997 and revised Guidance in 2001 to acknowledge Gebser and
208
Davis. Thus, school districts have been on official notice of the problems and were given strategies for coping with them nearly ten years ago.
Furthettttore, the upsurge in litigation has put them on notice that the
school itself as a hostile environment is the entity on trial, especially in
peer sexual harassment cases.
The OCR Guidance is now an integral part ofthis special and protected
school environment and therefore ofthe culture that school districts must
enhance to comply with Title IX in matters of sexual harassment.
Whether school districts have or will comply with the Guidance may be
up for debate, but they now have a detailed roadmap that the OCR states
it will follow when investigating school districts' Title IX compliance
209
and approving or withholding federal funding. The Guidance details
the legal structure for Title IX compliance responsibilities. It also details
the OCR's sense ofwhat constitutes student sexual harassment and how
school districts should respond to complaints. Among the requirements
is that schools have a grievance procedure in place to deal with Title IX
complaints generally. The OCR urges school districts to apply this sarne
10
grievance procedure to sexual harassment complaints.2 Although the
Gebser Court determined that the failure to have such a policy did not
establish the actual knowledge and deliberate indifference elements of
211
a sexual harassment claim, the passage of time and intervening cases
may recormnend that such failure is no longer excusable and constitutes
212
evidence of a hostile school environment.
School districts now know that they bear some responsibility for the
213
environment in their schools. Supreme Court precedent is clear that
207

Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034 (March 13, 1997), available
at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexharO l.html.
208
209

REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 185, at ii.

/d. at i.
210
Id. at 19-21.
211
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291-92.
212
See generally LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 95, at 38-41.
213
The author does not in any way think that such burdens are necessarily fair in most
circumstances, but is merely pointing out that they exist. Sometimes other issues become
more immediate concerns. For instance, as America's gun culture comes into schools,
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215

in matters relating to student drug use and student civility, school
districts bear a great deal of responsibility for their charges. Although
one may bemoan requiring that schools be responsible for controlling
sexual harassment, that horse has left the bam: school districts know it
216
is out there, and the Guidance tells them what to do about it. Having
been put on actual notice ofthis pandemic, school districts are now going
to be harder pressed to inoculate themselves from responsibility for doing
nothing in the face of any type of complaint. It therefore behooves the
litigants to be cognizant ofnot just the details of any particular harassing
event but also of hostility in the school environment itself, particularly
in light of those cases when successful plaintiffs stressed the systemic
failure of the school district to protect the children involved.
In its own review of Title IX compliance, the OCR looks at the
following indicia of a hostile environment in schools:
•The degree to which the conduct affected one or more student's
education....
•The type, frequency, and duration of the conduct.. ...
•The identity of and relationship between the alleged harasser and the
subject or subjects of the harassment. ... .
•The number of individuals involved... .
•The age and sex of the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of
the harassment. . . .
•The size of the school, location of the incidents, and context in which
they occurred. . . .
•Other incidents at the school....
217
• Incidents of gender-based but nonsexual harassment. ...

teachers and a<hninistrators must often resort to putting out the biggest fires. "Among
the most alarming reports, 28% of teens say they are aware of peers who have carried
or regularly carry guns and knives when they are in school." GEORGE H. GALLUP,
GROWING UP S,C ARED IN AMERICA AND WHAT THE EXPERTS SAY PARENTS CAN DO

ABOUT IT 3 (1995).
214

See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 (approving drug testing of students involved in
extracurricular activities).
215
See, e.g., Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683-84 (approving restrictions on students' First
Amendment rights while on campus).
216
See, e.g., Martha McCarthy, Students as Ta~gets and Perpetrators of Sexual
Harassment." Title IX and Beyond, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 212 (2001).
217
REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 185, at 6-7.
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The wise litigant investigates all these bases in preparation for filing a
complaint and in preparing for the inevitable motions. Stressing that
these responsibilities already redound to school districts as recipients
under Title IX should make it harder for school officials to suggest they
218
have no actual knowledge.
In contrast, students have been aware of sexual harassment in schools
long before the courts were aware. In its 1993 seminal survey, Hostile
219
Hallways, the American Association ofUniversity Women (AA.._. .
Educational Foundation painted a bleak picture: four in five students
experienced sexual harassment in school, affecting the educational
220
environment for both girls and boys. One-third of the students stated
221

that they experienced sexual harassment in elementary school. The
22
2001 AAUW Survef evinced no improvement in the intervening years
and nearly a generation of public school students; the same percentage
of students surveyed reported that they were sexually harassed in school
at some time in their lives, while the percentage of boys so reporting
223
increased.
In their special and presumably protected school enviromnent, students
report that sexual harassment most often occurs in the hallways and
224
classroom. The publicity ofhumiliation is often the motivation for this
218

In addition, a growing bank ofliterature exists to assist school districts and school
adtninistrators in curbing hostile school environments, some ofwhich predates Gebser
and Davis. A school district that feigns lack ofknowledge of the problem simply is not
looking. See, e.g., BRANDENBURG, supra note 199; LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 95;
MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL
IIARASSMENT:AREsOURCEMANUAL(1991);SHOOP&EDWARDS,supranote66;STEIN,

supra note 96.
219

AM. ASS 'N OF UNNERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOSTaEHALL-

WAYS:THEAAUWSURVEYONSEXUALHARASSMENTINAMERICA'SSCHOOLS4(1993).
220

/d.; Bodensteiner, supra note 16, at 3-4. Other national and state surveys are

outlined by Nan Stein. STEIN, supra note 96, at 10-27, 98-102, 117-21.
221
2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 20.
222

223

/d.

/d. at 3-4. The 2001 survey reported that"[ eighty percent] ofstudents experience
some form of sexual harassment during their school lives.'' /d. The survey acknowledged, however, that school districts made progress since the 1990s to either impQse
sexual harassment policies and/or distribute educational literature. /d.
224
/d. at 27.
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gendered te"orism. As the above-described cases exemplify, "[i]n
schools, sexual harassment happens in full view ofothers-in public places
such as hallways, lunchrooms, physical education classes, on school
buses, on school playgrounds, in classrooms, and at school sponsored
225
activities." Of course, the public nature of the humiliation has more
226
serious ramifications for the victims.
As such, litigants need to be cognizant of two things vis a vis the
school environment. First, the existence of a hostile environment makes
it harder for school officials to claim they do not have actual knowledge.
Even if a school official were to testify to the contrary, students know
better. Second, schools now have actual notice of their responsibilities
concerning Title IX, and the failure to abide by them may contribute to
a plaintiffs proof of the school's deliberate indifference. It is now no
longer acceptable to ignore the very public face ofpeer sexual harassment
227
and chalk it up to childhood inunaturity, flirting, or rites ofpassage.
That innocence is gone in some schools, and viciousness has taken its
place.

B. Of Sugar & Spice and Snips & Snails:
Gender and Student Sexuality Under Title IX

•

Peer sexual harassment is fundarnentally about gender issues in the
special school environment. However, student sexuality is a critical
adjunct to both gender issues and the hostility of the environment,
especially in understanding the following two elements of a peer sexual
225

NAN D. STEIN, SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN PUBLIC (AND PRI-

VATE) SCHOOLS

2 (1993).

Examples of sexual harassment that happen in public include attempts to snap bras
and grope at girls~ bodies; to puU down gym shorts or flip up skirts; circulation of
"summa cum.slutty" or "piece ofass ofthe week" lists; designation ofspecial weeks
for ugrabbing the private parts ofthe girls;" nasty, personalized graffiti written on
the bathroom walls; sexualized jokes and taunts which mock girls' bodies; and
outright physical assault and even rape in schools.

/d. at 2-3. Recent evidence indicates similar harassment occurs with boys whose sexual
orientation or sexuality is questioned.
226
/d. at 3.
227
See /d.; LEWIS & HASTINGS, supra note 95, at 25.
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harassment claim: whether the perpetrator's behavior is severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive, and whether the victim's response t() that
behavior is proof of denial of access to the school's educational opportunities. Both elements are tied to each other in an objective-subjective
paradigm as the litigator prepares the evidence in the case and frames the
issues around that evidence. First, was the behavior objectively offensive? Second, did the student subjectively believe that the school's
response to the behavior denied him equal access to educational opportu. . ?
mt1es.
In proving gender discrimination, the actionable misconduct often has
sexual overtones. Accordingly, a child's ability to understand those overtones-as both perpetrator and victim-may color a claim. Courts must not
b·e allowed to underestimate the sexual development ofchildren at a very
early age. In many of the reported cases, the courts seemed to distance
themselves from the realities of human sexuality. Relying on children's
inability to formulate abstract thought about their sexuality, courts asst1111e
that children are not sexual (or perhaps are viewed as asexual) and therefore either cannot engage in sexual harassment or misunderstand mere
228
flirting. The courts are sadly mistaken.
From birth, children are in an intimate and physical relationship with
their mothers. From suckling at their mothers' breasts to hygienic care
of their genitalia, children are early stimulated in sensual areas of their
229
bodies. They also observe appropriate fonns ofshowing affection such
230
as kissing, stroking, and similar forms of affection. By the age of four
or five, children start experimenting with secret sex play-playing doctornurse-patient ga1nes and familial role-playing games-and start experimenting with nudity. Children may not articulate their reasons for
engaging in such behavior other than that it feels good; at the same time,
adults begin to punish them for this forbidden behavior. In response,
231
children become more conscious and modest about such behavior.
Early childhood is also the stage when children begin being educated
about avoiding sexual abuse through such programs as Good-Touch/Bad228

See, e.g., Gabrielle M., 315 F .3d at 823.

229

FLOYD M. MARTINSON, THE SEXUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN 5-11 (1994).

230

!d. at 35-36.
231
ld. at 36-38.
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Touch®. This instruction begins as early as preschool and reaches well
into the intermediate grades in elementary school. Thus,-very young
children have a pretty good idea of what is and what is not sexual
behavior although they may not be able to articulate it.
Farther along that continuum, preadolescents have an extremely high
interest in sex although they have abandoned the innocent play of
childhood. Instead, sexual infotmation comes through the influence of
adults through their taboos and other observed behaviors. Separate gender
roles also become more apparent, with a male-oriented sexual subculture
233
encouraging and· supporting sexual activity.
By this time, sexual
thinking becomes more abstract, and children understand more about
biological issues and wish to have more infonnation than perhaps their
234
parents would prefer or are willing to offer.
Adolescents have their own, often problematic, chronology of sexual
development and maturity. Part of these problems of course arises
because-sexual maturity thatbegins in-preadolescence has far outstripped
adolescent cognitive functioning: what they lack in social maturity, they
235
more than make up for in sexual maturity.
Adolescent sexual challenges include
adjusting to the altered appearance and functioning of a sexually maturing
body, learning to deal with sexual desires, confronting sexual attitudes and
values, experimenting with sexual behaviors, and integrating these feelings,
attitudes, and experiences into a developing sense of self. The challenge is
accentuated by the unfamiliar excitement of sexual arousal, the attention
connected to b,eing sexually attractive, and the new level ofphysical intimacy
236
and psychological vulnerability created by sexual encounters.

232

To visit the Good-Touch/Bad-Touch® program website, go to http://www.
goodtouchbadtouch.com
233
MARTINSON, supra note 229, at 39-40.
234
See, e.g., RONALD GOLDMAN & JULIEITE GOLDMAN, CHILDREN'S SEXUAL
THINKJNG: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHILDREN AGED 5 TO 15 YEARS IN AUSTRALIA,
NORTH AMERICA, BRITAIN AND SWED'EN 389-93 (1982).
235
ROGER]. R. LEVESQUE, ADoLESCENTS, SEX, AND THE LAW: PREPARING ADOLESCENTS FOR RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 23 (2000).
236
Lisa J. Crockett, Marcela Raffaelli & Kristin L. Moilanen, Adolescent S~xuality:
Behavior and Meaning, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENCE 371 (Gerald R.
Adams & Michael D. Berzonsky eds. 2003).
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Pile onto these challenges the fact that many cultural influences promote
sexual permissiveness, if not promiscuity, and the fact that American
237
adolescents often receive little guidance in responsible sexual behavior,
and schools face a potent brew ofhonnones and violence.
These are the variously aged and variously maturing customers for
whose safety and well-being schools are being held accountable, hence
courts' deference to governance in these special environments and the
respons_es to the problems.
Sometimes lost in the consideration of peer harassment cases is the
analysis_that focuses_on the conduct's gender--not just sexual-context.
Similar to sexuality, gender relationships have a role in school environments. For young children, gender roles do not have much definition
although they are aware of physical differences. Not until they are told
they can no longer expose their nudity to each other do children concretely perceive the differences, although perhaps not the stereotypical
238
roles. Children then learn gender distinctions by the real and cultural
239
b-ehaviors to which they become socialized.
Preadolescence blurs
distinctions between the genders: boys and girls often o_verlap in activities,
sports, and apparel. However, girls are more likely to become the
untouchables in society, and children start to perceive social status
differences in the genders. Likewise untouchable are those children who
are perceived as less popular, less likely to have a romantic (and therefore
sexual) liaison. Therefore, teasing at this age is linked with gender roles
240
and stigma. Later, adolescents experience an intensification of gender
roles, and their psychological handicaps in wrestling with those roles
result in exaggerated gender stereotyping. Intensified gender stereotyping
leads to inappropriate expectations of how the genders must and should

237

See, e.g., Susan Shurberg Klein, Why Should We Care About Gender and
Sexuality in Education?, in SEXUALITY AND THE CURRICULUM: THE Po-LITICS AND
PRACfiCESOF SEXUALITY EDUCATION 171-72.(James T. Sears ed., 1992) [hereinafter
SEXUALITY AND THE CURRICULUM].
238
239

MARTINSON, supra note 229, at 37-39.

James T. Sears, The Impact of Culture and Ideology on the Construction of
Gender and Sexual Identities: Developing a Critically Based Sexuality Curriculum, in
SEXUALITY AND THE CURRICULUM, supra note 237, at 141.
240
/d. at 143-45.
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act at both extremes of the spectrum, stereotypes that are often
242
reinforced in schools. Thus, in tandem with a better ,abstract cognition
of sexual behavior, the sexuality of adolescent peer harassment takes on
a sharper focus than in elementary ,school.
243
But even at this more abstract level ofcognition, sexual harassment
is viewed by its effect on the victim, not necessarily by the action. Thus,
students see this as a gender rather than a sexual issue. Courts that
examine sexuality or lack thereof in the harassing act to the exclusion of
the gender roles miss the point.
[B]oth boys and girls emphasize in their definitions [of sexual 'harassment]
the effects of the action on the victim, whether intended or not, rather than
the action itself. For many, sexual harassment connotes verbal or physical
actions that create discomfort for the subject These defmitions mirror
prevalent legal definitions of sexual harassment in the workplace, which
emphasize the creation of a hostile work environment through verbal or
244
physical actions that cause discomfort.

From the students' standpoint, the most egregious fomts ofsexual harassment in which their fellow students eng,age are spreading sexual rumors,
pulling off (or down) their clothing, saying they were gay or lesbian,
forcing them to do something sexual other than kissing, spying on them
as they dressed or showered at school, and writing sexual messages or
241

The intensity ofthe adolescent experience
also increases the violence in the gender dynamics. Adolescents engage in more highrisk behaviors yet are more susceptible to peer pressure and confonnity. Consequently,
adolescents are also more susceptible to abusive "romantic" relationships as well as
experimentation with dangerous, adult behaviors. Unfortunately, they are not
emotionally able to deal with the fallout. /d. at 223-27. Adolescents also receive the
message that ,each gender has its own.Hsexual scripting." Mara Sapon-Shevin & Jesse
Goodman, Learning to Be the Opposite Sex, in SEXUALITY AND THE CURRICULUM, supra
LEVESQUE, supra note 235, at 213-14.

note 237, at 89.
242

supra note 199, at 43-44.
243
The AAUW study used subjects in eighth through eleventh grades, approximately
ages thirteen to seventeen. 2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 46.
244
/d. at 9. "When defming sexual harassment, many students· emphasize that the
behaviors must be unwelcome, unwanted, orunreciprocated. Several male respondents,
in particular, defme sexual harassment as the persistence of unwanted behaviors even
after the subjects make their intentions clear or behaviors and actions that do not mesh
with the subjects' desires or wishes." /d.
BRANDENBURG,
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graffiti about them on bathroom walls, in locker rooms, etc. This list
and the students' perceptions that these were the most upsetting fornts
of sexual harassment do not jibe with some courts' requirement that the
behavior be of a sexual nature as well as being objectively offensive. To
the contrary, children have the same responses to gendered harassment
that adults in the workplace do; the law just does not always recognize
that. Plaintiffs counsel must therefore be sensitive to the fact that both
gender roles and sexual politics are integral to proof of the perpetrator's
actionable conduct-proof of its severity, pervasiveness, and objective
offensiveness. In so doing, counsel must account for the differing weights
accorded those factors by victims of different ages.
Counsel also must weave throughout such proof the thread of the
conduct's objective offensiveness on the reasonable student. Perhaps a
reasonable-child standard should 'b e advocated. For instance, a
reasonable-girl standard could be adopted when the cause of action
246
involves a boy harassing a girl.
This standard would more closely
reflect the reality ofbeing a girl in the specialized environment at a certain
maturity level and with the particularized experiences of the gender, not
247
unlike the reasonable-woman standard used in Title VII cases. It is also
248
a pennutation of the reasonable-child standard used in tort law, the
generic source which should make a similar inquiry adaptable to those
249
c_ases when boys are the victims. An additional, helpful, and objective
perspective might appe_al to parental protectiveness, an in-court use of
the "teachable moment"_:hypothesizing how the judge or the individual
members of the jury would react if counsel asked when the judge's
250
daughter could come to court so the jury "could get a look at her tits."
24

s !d.

246

at 10-11.

See~ e.g.., Carrie L. Hoon, The Reasonable Girl: A New Reasonableness Standard

to Detennine Sexual Harassment in_Schools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 213 (2001).
247
/d. at 233-34; see also STEIN, supra note 96, at 31-32.
248
Hoon, supra note 246, at 226.
249
Similarly, the standard from the Supreme Court is useful: the reasonable person
"in the plaintiff's position considering 'all the-circumstances.'" Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U..S. 75; 81 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 23 ( 1993)). See generally CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MA'I*l'HEWS, A
LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 34-69 (2000);
Hoon, supra note 246, at 232~
250
SHOOP&_EDWARDS, supra note 66, at 54-55. At least it worked for Matthew
McConaughey in the climactic closing argument in the film, A Time to Kill.
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At that moment, the Title IX doubter understands not only the objective
offensiveness of the behavior but also the impact on the child's access
to education.
A litigator also needs to be cognizant of the specialness ofthe school
environment when assessing whether the victim's access to that environment has been affected. Every school has its idiosyncrasies, but the basic
physical plant, curriculum, and extracu1ricular activities must be exainined. The student workplace has little parallel in the adult workplace, so
the physical plant and the public areas are relevant. These little workers
are crammed in relatively I..arge numbers to work together in rooms, in
closer proximity than production-line, factory work. Then there are the
public corridors for passing between classe.s, student storage in lockers,
and passage to anyplace in the building. The next aspect is the academic
envirorunent: what children learn, under what circumstances they leant
best, their learrting styles, their work habits, and their ultimate success
in any particular subject. The third concern includes other activities that
may comprise the educational program to which a student might be
excluded. If one views extracurricular activities as integral to academic
success, such as sports, theatre, social and academic organizations, and
musical groups, then a student's feeling unable to participate could affect
her access to the educational program. Any nutnber of other idiosyncrasies can be included that might be affected by harassment, like group
undress and conununal toilet facilities.
Counsel must also be attentive to the very subjectivity ofthe victim's
response to the offensive conduct, the proof of which is a bit like quicksilver and hard to quantify: what constitutes exclusion from the educational program? Harassing conduct often occasions an emotional impact;

nearly half the students surveyed by the AAUW reported being very or
251
somewhat upset after experiencing perceived sexual harassment.
Although such evidence may not of itself warrant recovery under Title
252
IX, an emotional impact can have a direct effect on students' access
to their educational programs. Significant percentages ofstudents found
themselves not talking as much in class, not wanting to go to school,
changing their seating_assigrnnents, finding it hard to pay attention in
251

2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 32.
2 2
.5 But see Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (holding that Title VII does not require proof of
psychological batm).
·
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school, staying away from certain school locations, finding it hard to
253
study, and staying home from school or cutting class.The fallout ofTitle IX harassment must be directly tied to the program,
·n ot just the fact of the emotional, psychological, and physical consequences. So, counsel must be able to define what exactly that environmentshouldbe or should have been for the victim. Perhaps an educator's
or a parent's perspective will be useful. Regardless,_the child's own subjective notions of what he expects from the safety of school must figure
prominently in presenting evidence ofdenial ofhis access. All such proof
must stress the importance of education to children's growth, maturity,
and civic responsibilities.
One ofAmerica's preeminent educational philosophers, John Dewey,
attributed several distinct values to education: necessity of life, social
254
As an
function, growth, and instillation of direction and discipline.
institution integral to democracy~ schools must inculcate the values of a
255
democratic society. To do that, schools should ideally create a climate
and culture conducive to a leanting conununity, a positive school climate
256
that is committed to students and their learning. And to do that, schools .
should be safe. "A safe school is.where teachers can teach and students
can learn in a welcoming environment, free of fear and intimidation. It
is an educational setting where the climate promotes a spirit of acceptance
257
and care for every child . . . ~ "
The Supreme Court most famously
characterized schools this way::
1 3

experiences, while
students who underwent physical sexual harassment were more likely to suffer. /d.
s /d. at 36-37. Girls are more likely than boys to suffer these

See generally JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (Macmillan Co. 1966) (1944)'!
2
ss "Such a society must have a type ofeducation which gives individuals a personal
interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social
changes without introducing disorder." /d. at 99.
lS6 JAMES W. KEEFE&JOHN M. JENKINS, INSTRUCTION AND THE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT 9-10 ( 1997). "All major stakeholders-students, teachers, parents and_cormoonitywill view the school environment in a positive fashion. The shared perceptions of all
these stakeholders will validate the academic orientation of the school, its sense of collective responsibility and the sustained commitment to ,students and their learning." /d.
at 10.
257
ANNE G. GARREIT, KEEPING AMERICAN SCHOOLS SAFE: A HANDBOOK FOR
ls-4

PARENTS, STUDENTS, EOUCATORS, LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AND THE COMMUNfrY 64 (2001).
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[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local goverrunents. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the anned forces. It is the very
foundation ofgood citizenship. Today it is a principal instruntent in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
258
to all on equal terms.

The litigator might thus emphasize that there is a certain tipping point at
which, physical exclusion or not, psychological exclusion from an education not only violates Title IX but also is a dereliction of the state's duty
to the child.
The preceding discussion should impress upon counsel to itrunerse
herself in this very unusual world. She must frame the case-and indeed
the themes of the case-around that unique climate.

C. The Litigation Themes
Based on the literature and the cases, counsel might consider adopting
one or more of several themes in a peer sexual harassment case. Such
themes may include the funda1nental gender-bullying aspect ofthe most
successful cases, emphasis on the severity of the harassment, the two
primary models ofpeer harassment, and the nature ofexclusion from the
educational program. Given the facts of the cases above in which a
plaintiffwas successful in progressing beyond a dispositive motion, these
themes can be distilled as follows.
First, the systemic harassment in successful cases was directed either
at female students or at male students who were perceived as having
effeminate qualities (i.e., who were believed to be gay). The attacks
smacked of sexuality but really were directed more at that gender or
victim who seemed weaker. That pattern buttresses the notion that these
lss Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. of Topeka~ Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 493

(1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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cases really are perhaps more about gender discrimination than about
259
sex.
One of the lessons learned in these successful cases is that the
ostensibly sexual aspects are coupled with gender-bullying, a combination
260
of power and sex.
Tied to the first is the second feature of a successful ·p laintiffs
response to summary judgment,.which is an emphasis on the severity of
the harassment. Obviously, the pervasiveness ofrepeated and unrelenting
attacks adds to that emphasis. But proof in the successful harassment
cases combined powerissues as well as gender and sexuality in a manner
intended to humiliate-virtual rape, if you will. Rape is often acknowledged to be less a crime of sexuality and more a crime of violence.
Indeed, one theory of rape is derived from the ''cultural spillover" theory
that ''rape may be in.fluenced by the implicit or explicit approval of
violence in various areas of life such ,as education, the· mass media, or
sports."

261

Although a direct correlation between rape and legitimate,

socially approved violence cannot necessarily be drawn, an indirect coree259

The sexual harassment-discrimination dichotomy has borne at least four different
explanatory models that might fruitfully be applied to defme sexual harassment: ( 1) the
"formal equality" model,(2) the "sexual content" model, (3) the ''subordination" model,
and (4) the "gender regulation" model. Daniel G. McBride, Guidancefor Student Peer
Sexual Harassment? Not!, 50 STAN. L. REv. 523,541-547 (1998); see ,a lso Katherine
M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997).
These philosophical models, of course, were extrapolated before Davis. However, because each case is so fact-sensitive and motive-specific, no one model really assists in
creating the theme, nor for practical purposes are they really necessary.
260
"Most theories and models describe sexual harassment as a way to obtain sex
and/or to abuse or increase power." BRANDENBURG, supra note 199, at 40 (citation
omitted). One approach suggests that we re-orient our thinking about the sexuality part
of the behavior when it comes to children: the motive is not to receive something sexual
from the victim; rather the motive is to foist sexual abuse on the victim. Shelby Jean,
Peer Sexual Harassment Since Oncale and Davis: Taking the 'Sex out of 'Sexual
Harassm,ent,' 2000 MICH. ST. L. REV. 485,489--90
(2000).
.
261
.
LARRY BARON & MURRAY A. STRAUS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY: A STATE-LEVELANALYSIS 9 (1989) (emphasis added); see generally SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE ( 1975); RANDY THORNI

'

HILL&CRAIGT.PALMER,ANATURALHISTORYOFRAPE:BIOI.OGICALBASESOFSEXUAL
COERCION 124-28 (2000). Another theory suggests that rape is a biological and evolutional construct that might be triggered by many things, including violence. THORNHILL
&PAlMER, supra, at 4. However, other studies dispute the significance ofbotb genetic

and honnonal influences on male violence. Angela K. Turner, Genetic and Honnonal
Influences on Male Violence, in MALE VIOLENCE_233, 246-4 7 (John Archer ed. 1994).
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lation exists because the status of women is usually lower in those areas
262
where violence is more highly valued. Likewise, the motivation for
263
sexual harassment is as much about power as it is about sex. "Like any
other power struggle, many instances of sexual harassment are initiated
and negotiated by a person in a position of authority and are sustained at
the expense of another who cannot counter demands without risk of re264
prisal. " AI though peer harassment does not fall neatly into that theorem,
student victims tend to be those who are considered weaker or are subjected to harassment by a group. As a result, more successful cases
protect males rather than females, perhaps because the notion ofmale rape
is so alien to the bench that the perception of harm to boys is considered
265
greater.
That _power dynamic is then mixed with the biological imperative of
humans in children, which cannot be underestimated as a motive for
266
student sexual harassment. The primary reasons for which students
admit they engaged in sexually harassing behavior toward other students"it's just a part of school life," the perpetrator thought the victim liked
it, the perpetrator wanted a date with the victim, and the perpetrator's
friends encouraged him-have mixed motivations of sexual socialization
267
and approval ofviolence. The more violent reasons for these students
engaging in sexual harassment were to exert power over the victim or to
extract something from the victim.
The theme therefore for severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
behavior-its severity in particular-is to blur the lines between sexual
behavior and power over the weak, especially in instances when the
harassment did not last for months or years. The victim who proves the
school atmosphere both intimidated the victim and had an aura ofsex and
262
263

BARON & STRAUS,

supra note 261, at 187.
ROBERT J. SHOOP & JACK W. HAYHOW, JR., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN

OUR
SCHOOLS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED TO KNOW TO SPOT IT AND STOP IT!

29-32 (1994).
264

supra note 199, at 5 (citation omitted).
26
s That harm tnay be actual: because boys are expected to "take it like a man," they
endure such harassment without complaint longer than girls do.
266
See generally THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 261.
267
2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 41.
BRANDENBURG,
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power is better able to prove a hostile environment sufficient to hold a
268
If the severity of the attacks is emphasized,
school district liable.
perhaps less proof of pervasiveness will be required.
Third,- the victim might be attentive to the theme suggested by the
mode of harassment. The illustrative cases usually involve only the
following two models of peer sexual harassment: one perpetrator with
one or more victims, or one victim with numerous -perpetrators. Historically, the one perpetrator-one victim scenario is harder to win. That
outcome might be because those
cases
isolate
individual
acts
of
harass•
ment without accounting for either a hostile environment Sl..Jrrounding the
victim or the victim's perception of a hostile environment. Proving
systemic harassment in ,a one-on-one situation could be more successful
if the victim proves that, as far as he is concerned, the harassment was
systemic and that the one perpetrator made the victim's school environment hostile. Of course, evidence from the perpetrator's other victims,
if any, should be sought out, even if the incidents evinced only violence
rather than sex or gender issues~ But the point here is to piggy-back this
theme onto the previous theme when few incidents have occurred.
On the other hand, when the group -harasses the pariah-the several
perpetrators-one victim scenario-plaintiff-victims have a much easier
time proving a Title IX claim. The number of'incidents, the ongoing
nature ofthe harassment, and the cultural acceptance ofthe pack to attack

the weak leads,the courts to a better sense of a systemic hostile environment. The theme ofthis type ofharassment should obviously emphasize
pervasiveness and the systemic nature ofthe violence. But related to this
is the theme of the very public nature of the ongoing attacks, hence, a
lower burden of proving the school district's actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference.
Fourth is the theme necessary to persuade the trier of fact that the victim has been excluded from equal access to educational opportunity, even
with onlyps,ychological results. To begin, the litigant must associate herselfwith the appropriate reasonable-student standard. Title Vll standards
.

.

.

.

268

One must be careful not to blur the lines between bullying and sexual harassment.
See, e.g., Stein, supra note 96, at 783. However, given the difficulty in proving a sexual
harassment claim, it may serve plaintiff's interest to also explore state court claims under
anti-bullying or anti-harassment legislation.
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of the reasonable woman are going to involve a different analysis than
for public schoolchildren ofnearly any age. Although some students have
become somewhat inured to sexual harassment under circumstances that
269
might reflect adult reactions, nearly half are not. Instead, they experience embarrassment, self-consciousness, fear, loss of confidence, con270
fusion, and doubts about whether they can succeed in school.
The
victim should exploit data that counsels that younger victims of rape
271
suffer greater psychological pain ftomthe attack than do oldervictims.
Therefore, the victim should tap into expert witnesses who could actually
attest to something that might not otherwise be within the expertise of
the trier of fact, like the subjective and objective realities of a hostile
272
educational environment.
.
Those psychological feelings must then be appended to actual alienation, or exclusion, from the educational program, or at least from the
sense of safety the children should feel in school. According to the
National School Safety Center,
[i]n an attempt to escape the harassment, the victim plans activities around
an avoidance schedule. Her inability to stop the harassment results in anger,
humiliation, and shame. A sense ofbetrayal and stigmatization often results
in isolation and withdrawal from others. Even those few who stand up and
fight often lose the battle, thereby reinforcing the feelings of helplessness
273
generated by the abuse.

Children who have b'een harassed think differently about themselves, their
274
school experience, and their classmates, regardless of adult percep269

2001 HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 163, at 27.
270
/d. at 32-36.
271
THORNHILL & PALMER, supra note 261, at 89-90.
272
See, e.g., Jeremy D. Pasternak; Comment, Sexual.Harassment and Expertise: The
Admissibility ofExpert Witness Testimony in Cases Utilizing the Reasonable Woman
Standard, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 651 (1995); Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where is
the-Common Knowledge? Empirica/SupportforRequiringExpert Testimony in Sexual
Harassment Trials, 51 STAN. L. REv. 357 (1999).
273
SHOOP & HA YHOW, supra note 263, at 56.
274
/d.; Tianna McClure, Boys Will Be Boys.~ Peer Sexual Harassm_ent in_Schools and
the Implications of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 12 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S ·L.1. 95,103-05 (2001).
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tions, for student access to the educational opportunity has been altered.
At a vulnerable time in their lives when they are supposed to see schools
as safe havens and adults as their protectors, these students experience
conduct that alters_both their outlook on education and their own emotion215
al wellbeing. Thus, a plaintiffs lawyer is well-advised to seek deeper
roots of exclusion than just the physical aspects.
Developing a couple, if not all, ofthese themes would put counsel on
more even footing with the school district and would create a source of
276
education to the court.
For its part, the theme that a school district will and must follow will
draw to its strong suit: its officials did not act with deliberate indifference
because they know schools are the custodial repository for children, and
they take their responsibilities seriously. As discussed earlier, this
specific element has proved to ·be most nettlesome for plaintiffs, especially when schools follow an investigative procedure and mete out at
least some palliative remedy. Schools and teachers are in a tough spot
these days, with all the new legal and social duties imposed upon.them
for accountability, student behavior, social work, and sometimes even
education gets attention. Therefore, the theme. schools will always fall
back on~if they have done these two things-is that the courts should
c.ontinue to defer to schools in matters ofdiscipline and not second-guess
the measures that have been taken in this specialized environment.
A plaintiff must always respond with a two-pronged plan of attack,
both of which are inherent in the themes discussed above. First, the
plaintiffmust emphasize there is still lawyer-like context in the plaintiffs
cause of action so that the court cannot abdicate its judicial function in
a misplaced effort to defer to the school district's wisdom. Second, the
plaintiffmust also stress that the review ofthe school district's responses
27

s Is such fluff the stuff of a plaintifrs case?

Perhaps not entirely, but putting more
emphasis on what parents expect and what children actually experience at least creates
the theme of how children are treated in their own workplace under circumstances that
sometimes would seem daunting even to adults.
276
Plaintifrs counsel must similarly develop a list of expert witnesses to counterbalance the school district's witnesses. Ofparticular use would be education and psychology professors; child psychologists, other cbild advocates, retired teachers and
administrators,_and the like. The school district has its own, ready..made stable ofexpert
witnesses at its disposal. Plaintiff's counsel does well to keep that in mind.
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and remedial measures to peer harassment are not outside the court's
expertise. A court can clearly interpret whether a school is keeping its
children safe with the appropriate atmosphere and whether a school's
remedy has any meaningful chance ofpreventing or otherwise ameliorating further harassment. Ifa court cannot make that type ofjudgment call,
then a school district's responses have no boundaries. Courts can discern
on a case-by-case basis what constitutes sexual harassment and what is
277
not a school district's clearly unreasonable response.
Specialized
environment or not, schools are the workplace for children. If a victim's
counsel takes the time to educate the court about that environment,
perhaps Title IX cases will become more successful.

Conclusion
Trying an education case should not be as difficult as it sometimes is,
but the fear imbued in courts that school districts are more knowledgeable
than they has made courts exercise a greater an1ount of deference than
some cases warrant. Some cases really are outside the expertise of the
courts, but Title IX litigation is not really one of those kinds of cases.
Instead, Title IX more closely resembles the tort-like, legal types ofcases
that courts have tried for decades and in countless courthouses, especially
its direct analog, Title Vll. However, given the constraints created by
Davis and Gebser, plaintiffs' counsel will be forced to educate themselves
better about that specialized educational environment. Those efforts will,
ofcourse, be most successful when both sides can work on equal footing
and open up to the courts themselves the secrets of school districts at least
to a small extent to protect both boys and girls from a gendered violence
that is becoming, sadly, more prevalent and just as sadly unresolved .

•

277

Davies, supra note 32, at 429-30.
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